Short-Term Economic Forecasting by Franco Modigliani & Owen H. Sauerlender
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research






Chapter Title: ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS AND PLANS OF FIRMS
IN RELATION TO SHORT-TERM  FORECASTING
Chapter Author: Franco Modigliani, Owen H. Sauerlender
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c2903
Chapter pages in book: (p. 261 - 362)ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS AND PLANS OF
FIRMS IN RELATION TO SHORT-TERM
FORECASTING
FRANCO MODIGLIANI







THE LAST TWO DECADES a number of agencies, for various rea-
sons, have been surveying the sales expectations of large samples of
firms. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the usefulness of such
surveys for short-term economic forecasting. By "short term" we
mean a period of three to six months.
Our analysis utilizes survey data from three primary sources:
1. The forecasts of the Regional Shippers' Advisory Boards of
the Association of American Railroads. We shall hereafter refer to
these forecasts as the "shippers' forecasts." They have been prepared
on a quarterly basis and were first published in 1927. They report
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the carload shipments expected for the next quarter by a large
sample of firms in the manufacturing, mining, and agricultural in-
dustries.
2. Fortune magazine, Executive Forecasts. These forecasts were
obtained by means of a survey that secured information from sev-
eral th6usand top executives of firms in manufacturing, mining,
public utilities, communication, and financial institutions. The sur-
vey was conducted on a semiannual basis from November 1946 to
May 1950.
3. Dun & Bradstreet, Survey of Business Trends and Business
Expectations. This survey covers, primarily, small and medium-
sized firms in the of manufacturing and retail and wholesale
trade. It was initiated in the spring of 1947 and sixteen surveys had
been conducted at the time this paper was prepared.
In section B we discuss the nature of these surveys, the methods
by which they have been conducted (as far as is known to us), and
their limitations for the purpose of our analysis.
In parts of our analysis we have also utilized some áf the data on
sales expectations gathered by the Office of Business Economics,
Department of Commerce, and the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission in the course of their survey of capital expenditures antici-
pated by business firms.
The use of surveys of anticipations for short-term forecasting is
analyzed from two different points of view. In section C we examine
how accurately sales expectations have forecast the actual course
of sales. In section D we endeavor to test whether data on sales
expectations can be used for forecasting variables other than sales
themselves, especially production and inventory movements.
To test the forecasting accuracy of the firms responding to the
surveys we compute the percentage error committed by forecasters.
We find that for all of the surveys analyzed the forecasts exhibit a
substantial marginal error. For the prewar period, on the basis of
the only available source (the shippers' forecasts) we find that this
error, for all manufacturing industries combined, amounts to ap-
proximately 10 per cent. For the postwar period, where we have at
our disposal several sources and several industries in addition to
manufacturing, we find some variation, but in most cases the average
error is between 5 and 7 per cent. These are rather large errors
when one considers that the respondents were forecasting only three
to six months ahead.
We also find that the errors committed by the respondents ex-
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hibit certain interesting regularities. In all of the surveys analyzed
the respondents tended to overestimate sales for periods in which
sales actually fell and to underestimate them for periods in which
sales rose. For example, for 22 quarters between 1927 and 1941
when sales were falling, the shippers' forecasts were on the average
16 per cent above actual sales, and. for 23 quarters in the same
period when sales were rising, these forecasts were on the average
5 per cent below actual sales. This regularity results from the fact
that the respondents frequently failed to anticipate the direction of
change, and even when they correctly anticipated the direction
they seldom were able to gauge the full extent of the change.
Knowledge that the error of forecasts has been around 10 per
cent in the prewar period and between 5 and 7 per cent in the post-
war period is of limited value unless we have some standard against
which to measure the significance of this error. We proceed, there-
fore, to examine whether the forecasts made by the respondents are
on the average any better than the forecasts that might have been
made by simply extrapolating the latest level of activity. For this
purpose we compute the average error that would have been com-
mitted by forecasting that sales in the next period .would be equal
to sales in the latest preceding period. We compare this error with
the average error committed by the respondents. This analysis re-
veals some marked differences in the forecasting record of the four
surveys analyzed.
In the case of the shippers' survey it is found that both in the
prewar and in the postwar period the respondents' forecasts per-
formed appreciably worse than a simple extrapolation of the recent
past would have. In the prewar period, for instance, the average
error committed by extrapolation would have been 8 per cent,
whereas the average error of the shippers' forecasts was 10 per cent.
Similar results are found in the case of the Dun & Bradstreet survey.
In the case of the Fortune survey the picture is surprisingly dif-
ferent. In four of the five types of economic activities analyzed by
us the respondents' forecasts were better than a straight extrapola-
tion, the difference in some cases being pronounced. For instance,
in the case of durable goods the error of the respondents' forecasts
turns out to be some 23 per cent smaller than the error of a straight
extrapolation.
The forecasting record of the OBE-SEC survey also appears
rather favorable in the light of this test. Our analysis in this instance
is limited to data for oniy two years, 1948 and 1949. It appears, how-
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ever, that in both cases the respondents correctly forecast the direc-
tion of change though they somewhat underestimated the magni-
tude of the change (see section C 4).
At the end of section C we advance some tentative explanations
for the marked superiority, in terms of forecasting record, of the
Fortune and OBE-SEC surveys over the shippers' and Dun & Brad-
street surveys.
In section D we develop certain mathematical models for the
purpose of testing the significance of sales expectations in shaping
the course of production and inventories. In these models we em-
phasize the role of inventories in permitting a firm to produce at a
relatively even rate throughout the year even though its sales are
subject to marked seasonal fluctuations (sections D 1-4). Statistical
tests of these models are then carried out by fitting them to cross-
sectional data of individual firms at a single point of time (section
D 5) and to time-series of aggregates (sections D 6-7).
The tests described above are designed to throw light on three
major questions: How well do our models describe the facts? Is
there any evidence that economic expectations, as reported in sample
surveys, have any influence on the course of short-term movements
of production and inventories? Is information on expectations se-
cured by sample surveys of any help in forecasting production and
inventory movements?
The of tests we have been able to carry out so far is
rather limited. Nevertheless, the results with respect to each of the
questions listed above are definitely encouraging. And although we
are not yet justified in reaching any final conclusions, these results
certainly suggest the desirability of continuing the type of analysis
in which we have been engaged.
B. The Nature of Avaifrible Data on Expectations
Most of the analysis that follows is based on data from the three
sources listed earlier. It will be convenient to give here a brief
description of each of these.
1. FORECASTS OF REGIONAL SHIPPERS' ADVISORY BOARDS, ASSOCIATION
OF AMERICAN RAILROADS
Since the middle of the 1920's the firms responsible for the bulk
of our railway freight traffic have been members of the so-called
Regional Shippers' Advisory Boards. The general function of these
boards is to provide a medium through which the shippers can ad-
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vise the Association of American Railroads of their shipping prob-
lems. Since around 1927 these boards have also been providing the
railroads with a quarterly forecast of the number of cars required
to move the shippers' products.
Shippers are .divided into thirteen regional Advisory Boards and
the members of each board are further divided into thirty-two major
commodity groups, the definition of which has remained remark-
ably stable for the last twenty-five years. Each commodity group in
each region is expected to provide a forecast of the number of cars
required for the next calendar quarter, through a poii of its members
conducted about six weeks before the beginning of the quarter. These
regional forecasts are then collected by the Car Service Division of
the AAR and published on the first day of each quarter in a release
entitled "National Forecast of the Regional Shippers' Advisory
Boards." (See also Thor Hultgren's discussion of these forecasts, in
the paper immediately following this one.)
The specific methods of collecting and processing the individual
shippers' forecasts have varied somewhat over time and from board
to board. Generally, the secretary of the board mails out a question-
naire to each member asking for the number of cars the member
expects to require in the coming calendar quarter and the actual
number of cars shipped in the corresponding quarter of the year
before. For each commodity anticipated requirements and actual
shipments of the respondents are totaled, and the expected per-
centage is computed. The regional forecast is then calculated by
applying this ratio to the total actual number of cars shipped from
the particular region in the corresponding quarter of the year before.
This forecast may be modified by the Commodity Chairman or at
the quarterly meetings of the membership of the regional board,
but such modifications seem to occur only exceptionally.
In certain boards, notably the Midwestern Board, which covers
the Chicago area, this procedure is modified to the extent that in-
formation from the shippers is secured directly from the Commodity
Chairman. In such cases, to avoid disclosure of information to a
competitor (since the chairman of the board is a shipper), the ship-
pers are asked only for the expected percentage change. With the
help of this response the Commodity Chairman prepares the forecast.
One would expect that forecasts secured by this procedure would
tend to be less reliable than the ones secured through the. more
formal and systematic alternative procedure described earlier. How-
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ever, a comparison of the forecasts with actual shipments in no way
supports this hypothesis.
The coverage of the Shippers' Advisory Board survey varies from
one commodity group to another, and from region to region. Avail-
able evidence indicates that firm representation varies from 25 to 80
per cent. In terms of actual shipments, however, coverage is gen-
erally higher because special efforts are made to secure estimates
from the larger firms in a commodity group as well as from mem-
'bers of the commodity groups that are of greatest importance in
that particular region. As a result the percentage of shipments rep-
resented is usually in the order 'of 50 per cent or more.1
In this paper we are concerned exclusively with forecasts relat-
ing to commodities that can be classified approximately as "manu-
factured commodities." In table 1 below we list the nineteen com-
modity groups included in the shippers' survey that can be so
classified, and show, for the year 1948, the number of carloads of
each commodity shipped, expressed as a percentage of shipments
of all manufacture.d commodities.
TABLE 1
Manufackired Commodities Covered by Shippers' Survey
and Their Relative Importance in 1948
Carloads Carloads
Shipped, Shipped,
as Per Cent as Per Cent
of Total of Total





Lumber and forest products 19.1 Automobiles and trucks 3.4
Petroleum and petroleum Vehicle parts 3.2
products 14.9
Sugar, syrup, and molasses 1.9
Iron and steel 16.2
Other metals 1.2
Fertilizers, all kinds '5.5
Paper, paper board, and
prepared roofing materials 7.8
Chemicals and explosives 2.9
Machinery and boilers 1.8 Food products in cans
Cement 5.0
Brick and clay products 2.2
Lime and plaster 1.4
and packages 2.8
Frozen foods, fruits, and
vegetables 0.1,
Source: Compiled from data of regional Shippers' Advisory Boards, Associa-
tion of American Railroads.
For at least two commodity groups the forecast is prepared by a single
agency representing the shippers and is not the aggregate of individual firms'
forecasts. The first of these two cases is the commodity group, automobiles and
trucks; for this group the estimates for every region are prepared by a single
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For further discussion of the design of the survey, the quality of
the sample, and the reliability of the replies, the reader is referred
to "The Railroad Shippers' Forecasts," prepared by Robert Ferber
as part of the Merrill Project and published as University of Illinois
Bulletin 74, June 1953.
2. FORTUNE MAGAZINE, EXECUTIVE FORECASTS
For several years Fortune magazine has been conducting a sur-
vey of a large sample of- top executives. These surveys are known as
the "Forum of Executive Opinion." Eight of them, those started in
November 1946 and conducted in May and November of each year
through May 1950, provide answers to questions about economic
expectations.
The Fortune questionnaire typically consists of three sets of ques-
tions:
1. A battery of questions relating to expectations about the future
state of business in general and about the future level of such in-
dexes as the gross national product, Federal Reserve Board index
of production, and Bureau of Labor Statistics cost of living index.
2. A battery of questions relating to expectations and plans of
the respondent's firm. This section includes questions on sales,
profits,selling price and purchase price expectations, expected
change in investment and inventories, etc. At our suggestion ques-
tions relating to recent business experience were added in later
surveys.
3. A number of questions under the heading "Current Opinions."
These questions relate to attitudes toward certain current issues of
a political-economic character.
The Fortune questionnaire is generally addressed to a list of
many thousands of respondents. Though a detailed discussion of the
mailing list is beyond the scope of this paper, it can be said that the
sample is not scientifically designed. Broadly speaking, it is a large
sample of top executives of medium-sized and large firms across the
country. The number who actually reply to the questionnaire has
been usually about 4,000 to 5,000, but this does not represent a
high rate of response.
To interpret the rate of response correctly, however, it should be
agency in Detroit. The other case is coal, where, in at least one region, the
forecast is prepared by the local coal operators' association. In the case of
automobiles and trucks, tests carried out suggest strongly that the forecasts are
distinctly poorer than average.
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noted that Fortune has classed the respondents into two groups.
The first consists of those who at some time had indicated an inter-
est in responding to future surveys. The other consists of those who
had not so indicated, or who perhaps had so indicated at a much
earlier time. The rate of response for the first group has been about
50 per cent, but for the second group it has been much lower. In
general we could not detect a significant and systematic difference
in the patterns of response of the two groups. For an idea of the
distribution of respondents by size of firm, see table 2.
The Fortune survey has a number of serious drawbacks from
the point of view of the analysis in which we are interested.
To begin with, it is a mail survey, and we are faced, therefore,
with the problem that the respondents are a self-selected special
subgroup of the sample composing the mailing list,sample, as we
have already noted, itself difficult to classify.
Some tests have been made and some are still in progress to
assess the possible bias that may be introduced by these character-
istics of the survey. For one thing, we have reason to believe that
the respondents consist of oniy those people who have fairly definite
ideas about the large number of questions posed in the question-
naire. The major evidence consists of a comparison of the pattern
of response to the Fortune questionnaire with that to the Dun &
Bradstreet survey, to be discussed later.
In the case of the Fortune survey the rate of total nonresponse is
fairly large, but among those who respond the rate of refusal on
individual questions is fairly low; for instance, the rate of refusal
on the question about expected sales in the respondents' own firm
has been in the order of 1 per cent, and on the questions relating to
general business conditions it has been only slightly higher, around
3 per cent. On the other hand, the Dun & Bradstreet survey, which
involves personal interviews, frequently shows a high rate of non-
response on individual questions. For instance, on the question
about expectations of sales for the respondent's own firm the rate
of refusal runs from 20 to 30 per cent, and for general business ex-
pectations as high as 50 per cent.
Thus one might suspect that the Fortune questionnaire gives us
mainly the expectations of those who have well-defined opinions on
general business conditions. Whether this involves a systematic bias
is something that will be touched upon later.
Another attempt to determine the possible bias due to the self-
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ture of response by speed of response. It has been suggested that,
under certain conditions, the opinions of late respondents would
tend to be closer to the opinions of nonrespondents than to those of
prompt respondents.2 This analysis gives us some indication that
prompt respondents tend to be somewhat more optimistic than the
average in the generally pessimistic surveys, and somewhat less op-
timistic than the average in the generally optimistic surveys. This
might suggest that people who feel that their views run counter to
the dominating views have a greater inclination to respond than
others. The effect of such a reaction would be to yield a sample
average expected change that is closer to zero than the population
average, and also to produce a sample variance greater than the
population variance (since the sample frequency around the mean
would tend to be relatively smaller than the population frequency).
However, the evidence suggesting this type of bias is by no means
conclusive.
Another serious drawback of the Fortune survey is that some of
the questions are not formulated with sufficient precision for the
purpose of our analysis. An important instance is the question re-
lating to expected sales. In the survey of May 1950 the question
reads: "What are you expecting for the second half of 1950 in
ing plans for own firm? Compared to the first half, which of
the following are you expecting as far as your gross sales (or total
revenue) are concerned?
A sharp increase (15% or more)
A moderate increase (between 5% and 15%)
No appreciable change or minus 5%)
A moderate decrease. (between 5% and 15%)
A sharp decrease (more than 15%)
No estimate."
The correspOnding question in other surveys has been formulated
in a similar fashiOn.
The above question does not indicate whether the reply should
be made on a seasonally adjusted basis. Our analysis of the responses
to this question, together with the facts that many other questions
in the Fortune questionnaire specifically instruct the respondents
to give a seasonally adjusted answer and that none instructs him to
the contrary, suggests that the respondents tend to give a seasonally
2 Robert Ferber, "The Problem of Bias in Mail Returns: A Solution," Public
Opinion Quarterly, winter 1948-1949.
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adjusted answer. In our analysis we have usually so assumed. How-
ever, it is clear that this lack of precision may be a serious source
of error.
Another serious difficulty is that the respondent is not asked to
quantify his answer freely but is given instead a fivefold choice of
answer, as illustrated in the question quoted above. For, the type
of analysis we intend to carry out it would be desirable to describe
the frequency distributions of the answers in terms of more con-
ventional parameters such as some measure of central tendency and
of dispersion.
In the early stages of our work we seemed to have some evidence
that the expectations reported in the surveys then available might
constitute a randOm sample drawn from a normally distributed
population. When the cumulative distribution of the replies to a
given question was graphed on normal probability paper, using as
class limits the figures given in parentheses after each of the optional
answers, the points tended to lie very close to a straight line. Stand-
ard tests of significance indicated that the discrepancies of the ob-
served distribution from a normal distribution were not significant
at the 5 per cent level. This suggested that the distribution could be
characterized by the two parameters of the normal distribution, the
arithmetic mean and the standard deviation. These two parameters
were obtained by fitting a normal distribution to the observations
by means of a modified maximum likelihood approach.
Unfortunately, this approach had to be discontinued. For recent
surveys the hypothesis of normality cannot be reasonably maintained.
This result is partly associated with the fact that the average ex-
pected change tends to differ more markedly from zero in the recent
surveys than in those we first analyzed. It appears that the fre-
quency distribution is approximately normal when the average is
around zero, but that normality no longer holds when the average
is sizably different from zero. In the latter case, at least for the
Fortune respondents, the curve 'becomes skewed, with the longer
tail extending to the left when the average is positive and to the
right when it is negative.
The above phenomenon poses some interesting questions con-
concerning both the structure of expectations and the influence of the
form of a question on the response. These problems are, however,
beyond the scope of this paper. It will suffice to indicate that we
have been forced to drop our original method of estimating central
tendency and dispersion in favor of one that makes much lessre-
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strictive assumptions as to the nature of the frequency distribution
of the response. Our present measure of average expected percent-
age change is a normally interpolated median estimated by graphic
methods, and our measure of dispersion is the semi-interquartile
range with the quartiles also estimated by normal interpolation. Al-
though there is no solid theoretical foundation to support this
method as against many possible alternative procedures, the meas-
ures described are at least simple and economical to compute.
The details of the procedure are illustratçd by chart 1, which
shows the estimated average expectation and dispersion of the












* Normal probability scale.
Chart 1. Computation of Median Expected Change in Sales, Durable Goods
Industry, Two Fortune Surveys, May• 1948 (Survey 23) and May 1949 (Sur-
vey25)
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and 25, conducted respectively in May 1948 and May 1949. First,
the four obtainable points on the cumulative distribution are graphed
on normal probability paper in the manner described earlier. Next,
we locate the two points between which the median falls, and join
them by a straight line. The abscissa of.the point at which this line
intersects the 50 per cent line is our estimate of central tendency,
which we refer to as the average expected change.
To locate thefirst and third quartiles we proceed as above, using
the points between which the first and third quartiles respectively
fall. Our measure of dispersion is one-half the difference between
the third and first quartiles. Thus in the chart presented the average
is estimated at +2 per cent for surveyand —7.7 per cent for
survey 25. The third quartiles are respectively at 8 per cent and 0.5
per cent, and the first quartiles at —5 per cent and —13 per cent.
The dispersions are therefore equal to 6.5 per cent for survey 23
and 6.75 per cent for survey 25.
The reader will observe that the points plotted on the chart from
survey 23 lie on a fairly straight line, which intersects the 50 per
cent line at +2 per cent, i.e. rather close to zero. On the other hand,
the points plotted from survey 25 do not approximate a straight line,
and the curve passing through them intersects the 50 per cent line
at about —8 per cent, i.e. some distance from zero. In general all the
data from the surveys tend to exhibit such characteristics. The cumu-
lative frequency distributions that yield an estimate of a median rather
close to zero tend to approximate a straight line when plotted on
normal probability paper, indicating a distribution fairly close to
normal. Distributions that yield an estimate of a median not close
to zero, on the other hand, do not fall on a straight line when simi-
larly plotted, indicating a departure from normality.
It will be noted, further, that our measure of central tendency is
an unweighted average, with no allowance for, differences in the
size of the respondents' firms. In other words, data from large and
small concerns receive the same weight in the averaging process.
The reason for the above procedure relates to another drawback
of the Fortune survey: except for the last two surveys the question-
naire did not solicit any information 'indicating the size of the re-
spondent's firm. It was only in the surveys conducted in November
1949 and May 1950 that the respondents were asked the question,
"Approximately, how many employees does your company have?"
A frequency distribution of the response to this question for those
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industries in which we are presently interested was given in table 2
above for the survey conducted in May 1950.
An analysis of cross tabulations by size of firm of the responses
to the most important questions on expectations does not reveal any
evidence of correlation between size of firm and average expecta-
tions. This point is illustrated in table 3, in which we show the dis-
tribution of the replies to the questions on expected change in gross
sales for four different size groups, for the survey of May 1949. In
table 4, we exhibit our measure of average expected changes and of
dispersion for each size group. There obviously is no systematic' re-
lation between average expected change and size, although there are
some indications that the dispersion of expectations is negatively
correlated with the size of firms. Similar results were found for the
survey conducted in May 1950. This lack of correlation between
size of firm and average expectation is broadly confirmed by our
analysis of the returns of the Dun & Bradstreet survey.
The above considerations lead us to hope that our inability to
weight firms by size when we compute the average expected change.
does not lead to serious, bias in the estimate, although direct evi-
dence to this effect is available only for the last. two of the Fortune
surveys.
3. DUN & BRADSTREET, SURVEY OF BUSINESS TRENDS AND
BUSINESSEXPECTATIONS
Surveys of business expectations were first conducted by Dun &
Bradstreet in the spring of 1947 and in 'the spring of 1948. From
April to November of 1949 the surveys were on a monthly basis, and
from November 1949 to date they have been conducted on a quar-
terly basis.
This survey avoids the problem of seasonality by asking the re-
spondents to state their expectations and experiences in terms of
relative to the corresponding period of the year before. The
of reference, however, has changed from survey to sur-
vey, being sometimes the whole year, sometimes a half year, and
sometimes a quarter. This is a serious source of lack of compara-
bility with the Fortune survey, and more will be said on this mat-
ter later.
The Dun & Bradstreet questionnaire is administered by personal
intervjew, and the number of respondents has usually been about
1,000. sample is drawn from a list of approximately 54,000 firms,
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TABLE 4
Average Expected Change in Sales, All Respondents,






















Source: Compiled from data of Fortune magazine.
lecting information on their financial status. For further details the
reader is referred to the various releases issued by Dun & Bradstreet
(see, for instance, the release dated June 29, 1949).
On the whole the Dun & Bradstreet survey covers firms of ap-
preciably smaller size than does the Fortune survey. (Compare the
figures in column 3 of table 5 with those in the last row of table 3.)
The size of the firms in each class shown in table 3 is reasonably
comparable with the size of the firms in the corresponding class in
table 5, where the measure of size is the volume of yearly sales,
since yearly sales per employee in manufacturing industries were
in the order of $13,000duringthe years 1948 and 1949.
Our analysis of the Dun & Bradstreet data is nOt as advanced as
our analysis of the Fortune survey. At the very start of this study
TABLE 5
Frequency Distribution, by Size of Yearly Sales, of Manufacturing Firms
Responding to Dun & Bradstreet Survey, August 1949
Yearly Sales.
(thousands of dollars) Number
Per Cent of Total
Reporting Salesa
Under 500 1139 33.7
500 but less than 1,000 107 26.0
1,000 but less than 5,000 123 • 29.9
5,000 but less than 80,000 84 8.8







a Thefigures are .onlyapproximate as they are derived from frequency
distributions whose class limits do not exactly coincide with those used in this
tabulation.
Source: Compiled from data of Dun & Bradstreet.
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Fortune generously gave us all of their survey data in the form of
IBM cards. Later we worked out a plan with Dun & Bradstreet to
secure the tabulations we needed to carry out the type of analysis in
which we are interested. A special plan was necessary because the
Dun & Bradstreet respondents, unlike the Fortune respondents, are
individually identified, and the collecting agency is, of course, care-
ful not to supply any information that might enable us to identify
the respondents. So far, therefore, we have been able to analyze
only a fraction of the Dun & Bradstreet data.
Further details of the Dun & Bradstreet survey are best given in
connection with the analysis presented below, especially section C 2.
C. How Well Do Firm$' Anticipations Forecast Sales?
1. INTERWABPERIOD
The forecasts of the Shippers' Advisory Boards are the only data
we have been able to analyze for the purpose of testing, for the in-
terwar period, the ability of firms to forecast sales.
As indicated previously, the shippers' forecasts have been coi-
lected on a systematic basis since the middle of 1927. Thus we have
at our disposal forecasts for nearly 100quartersfor 32 different in-
dividual commodities in 13 different regions. Furthermore, these
data are very suitable for a comparison with the actual course of
events because the same source that collects the forecasts also sup-
plies us with exactly comparable statistics of the actual course of
shipments. We can ascertain, therefore, how well the shippers' an-
ticipations have performed in forecasting the actual course of car-
load shipments in the following quarter. In the present section we
shall deal only with the interwar period, which consists of 58 quar-
ters beginning with the third quarter of 1927 and ending with the
last quarter of 1941. For reasons that will become apparent the post-
war period will be analyzed separately, together with the data on
anticipations provided by other sources.
There are a great number of possible methods. by which the
shippers' anticipations might be tested for forecasting accuracy.
Furthermore, any given method could be applied to the aggregate of
all commodity groups or regions, or to individual commodity groups,
or to individual regions. A systematic analysis of this type is pre-
sented by Robert Ferber in "The Railroad Shippers' Forecasts," in
University of Illinois Bulletin 74, June 1953. We shall present here
only some of the most significant results.
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The first test we present is based on analysis of the error of fore-
cast. For any given commodity or quarter the percentage error of
forecast is defined as the difference between the shippers' forecast,
and the actual number of carloads,expressed as a percent-
age of the actual number of carloads, i.e.
Two tests based on this quantity are shown in table 6. In column 2
we show the simple arithmetic average of the percentage error of
forecast for all manufactured commodities taken together and for
certain industries taken separately. It will be observed that for all
manufactured commodities, in the prewar period, 1927-1941, ship-
pers tended on the average to' overestimate shipments by some 4
per cent. This tendency to overestimate on the average holds also for
individual 'commodities with but one exception. The entries in, col-
umns 3, 4, and 5 show the mean ratio for groups of quarters ac-
cording to the trend of actual shipments. A given quarter is classi-
fied as "rising" when actual carloads in that quarter were more than
5 per cent higher than in the corresponding quarter of the year
before; it is classified as "falling" if shipments were more than 5
per cent below the crresponding quarter of the year before; it is
classified as "level"
It will be' seen that shippers tend to overestimate carloads
markedly when shipments are falling,' the average overestimate being
as high as 16 per cent. On the other hand, when shipments are
rising the average error is negative, indicating that shippers tend
then to. underestimate shipments, although the error is in this case
considerably smaller. This same pattern is repeated for every one Of
the five individual industries for 'which data are shown in table 6.
The comparison of means by trends of carloadings is interesting
because it suggests immediately a definite tendency for anticipation
to lag behind actual events. It is clear, in fact, that if anticipations
lag behind shipments, they will tend to overestimate when the trend
is down and underestimate when the trend is up.
It will be further noted that, at least for all manufactured com-
modities, when the trend in shipments is "level" the average error
is exactly zero. This result suggests that the overall tendency for•
The trend is defined in terms of the corresponding quarter of the year
before to eliminate the necessity of an explicit seasonal adjustment. .Though
this method is crude, experiments with more refined methods have given es-












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.EXPECTATIONS AND PLANS OF FIRMS
anticipation to overestimate shipments in the period observed may
not be due so much to a systematic upward bias as to the tendency
to overestimate shipments when they are falling, coupled with the
overall declining trend of carloadings in the period.
The mean errors that we have been discussing are primarily use-
ful as a measure of systematic bias but are otherwise not very il-
luminating as a measure of accuracy of forecasts.
Clearly, in an arithmetic average, errors of opposite sign offset
each other, so that the average may be close to zero even though
the individual errors are large. A more revealing measure of ac-
curacy can be secured by averaging the errors without regard to
sign, i.e. by computing. the average absolute percentage error of
forecast. This statistic is shown in column 6 of table 6. It begins
to be apparent from the figures in this column that the shippers'
anticipations have not been too accurate in forecasting shipments.
.For all manufacturing industries the forecast was, on the average,
in error by as much as 10 per cent, a significant figure if one con-
siders that the shippers are forecasting only one quarter ahead.
With the exception of the flour and petroleum industries the record
is even poorer for individual commodities; for iron and steel and
agricultural implements, for instance, the average error exceeds
20 per cent.4
While the figures we have just examined indicate that the ship-
pers' forecasts tend to err by substantial margins, it is difficult to
evaluate this result unless we have some standard against which to
measure the shippers' performance. an average forecasting
error of 10 per cent may be. serious for a series that exhibits only
very small movements from quarter to quarter, but not for a series
subject to violent short-term changes. We may suspect that this
basic variability probably has a good deal to do with the marked
difference in the forecasting record of individual industries. To
throw light on this subject it will be useful to compare the error of
the shippers' forecast with the error that might have been made
by the use of some simple and mechanical extrapolation formula.
This procedure is what has .been called in recent discussions a
naive model test.
The simplest type of naïve model that has been suggested is to
The years 1946-1950 were included in computing the average absolute
error for the last eight items in table 6, .sincea separate analysis of these
industries is not given for the postwar period. The inclusion of the sixteen
postwar quarters does not affect the picture significantly.
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forecast by extrapolating either the latest level or the latest rate
of change. This yields a forecasting formula of the type
= ; =+ —
These models, which are quite satisfactory for yearly data, are
not immediately applicable to our case, however, because of the
strong seasonal components in all series. Obviously, even naïve
models need not ignore the presence of seasonal variation. On the
other hand, it does not seem reasonable to introduce an explicit sea-
sonal adjustment factor computed by means of standard statistical
techniques, as the use of these techniques would hardly be con-
sistent with the notion of a naïve model test. We have made use,
therefore, of a very simple model that does not require explicit ad-
justment for seasonal variation and seems to be extensively used by
people not familiar with more sophisticated techniques. T'n this we
assume that if in the first quarter there was, say, a 5 per cent in-
crease over the first quarter of the previous year, the same thing
will, happen in the second quarter.
The specific model we have used is represented by the equation
(1)'
denotes here the naïve model forecast for quarter t; is the
actual quantity for the same quarter of the year before; and
represents the adjustment for the change that has occurred in
the course of the year ending at the point where the forecast is
made, namely the quarter t—1.
The question we want to test is whether the shippers' forecasts are
any better than the forecasts that can be made by use of this
formula. For this purpose we have computed the average absolute
percentage error which would have resulted by forecasting the com-
ing quarter according to this formula. This "naïve model error" is




where N indicates the number of forecasts included in the test.
The naïve model error for total manufactured commodities and
for five selected commodities is shown in table 6, column 7.It
should be noted that, by the very nature of our naïve model, the
figures of column 7 may also be taken as a measure of variability in
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the series forecast, arising from factors other than seasonal varia-
tion and possibly exponential trend. If the only source of variation
consisted of the recurrent seasonal and an exponential trend, we
should have
A= and,therefore, 1=0
The naïve model error of column 7 would therefore be zero. Hence
the larger the figures of column 7, the larger must tend to be the
variability, other than seasonal and trend, of the given series.
A comparison of the figures in column 7 with the average
lute shippers' error shown in column 6 reveals immediately two
significant facts: (a) There is a close positive association between
the two sets of figures, indicating that the differences in the fore-
casting aècuracy for individual commodities are largely controlled
by the short-term variability (other than seasonal and trend) in the
shipments of the commodity. (b) For every individual commodity,
as well as for all manufactured commodities, the error of the ship-
pers' forecasts exceeds the error of the naïve model. In other words,
for every one of the commodities sampled in table 6 the forecast
based on the naïve model of formula 2 would have resulted on the
average in an error smaller than that made by the respondents to
the shippers' survey.
A third observation suggested by the comparison of columns 6
and 7isthat the ranking of the commodities in order of accuracy
indicated by column 6 is considerably changed when we take into
account the difficulty of forecasting due to the underlying variability
of the series. This point is brought out clearly by the "coefficient of
relative accuracy" in column 8. This coefficient is obtained by sub-
tracting the figure of column 6 from that of column 7 and expressing
the result as a percentage of the figure of column 7. The coefficient,
therefore, measures the relative superiority (if positive) or inferior-
ity (if negative) of the respondents' forecasts compared with the
naïve model.
If the respondents had made a perfect forecast in every single
instance, the figure of column 6 would be zero and our measure of
relative accuracy would become unity; this is the highest value that
the coefficient can take. If the figures of columns 6 and 7 are equal,
the coefficients will take the value zero, indicating that the forecast
made with the naïve model is just as good as the respondent's fore-
casts. Finally, if the average forecasting error of the respondents
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exceeds that of the naïve model, as in the present instance, the co-
efficient in column 8 will be negative and will take any value up
to minus infinity. We see from column 8 that according to this
measure of accuracy,. flour, meal, etc. and agricultural implements
rank highest, while lumber and forest products ranks lowest with
an average error more than 50 per cent larger than that of the naïve
model. For all manufactured commodities together, the shippers'
error is some 20 per cent larger than that of the naïve model—an
amazingly high figure.
The rather negative results we have reached so far with respect
to the forecasting record of the shippers' survey are further con-
firmed by our third and last test. Instead of comparing the fore-
casted with the actual level of shipments, we shall compare the
forecasted with the actual rate of quarter to quarter change in ship-
ments; more specifically, we shall examine whether there exists a
significant positive correlation between these two series, i.e. between
and This test has one important point in common
with the test we have just described. If we find that the correlation
between the actual and anticipated rates of change does not differ
significantly from zero, that fact will imply that the shippers' fore-
casts are no better on the average than a forecast of "no change."
Hence the size of the correlation coefficient represents a measure of
the extent to which the shippers' forecasts are better than a naïve
model that forecasts no change at every point of time.
The present test differs, however, from the previous one in that
we are now giving the respondents the benefit of any constant bias•
in their forecast. Suppose, for instance, that the respondents always
underestimate the actual rate of change by a constant amount; under
this condition every one of the forecasts would be in itself erroneous:
The average error of column 2 might be large and the coefficient
of column 8 might not be much larger than zero or even negative;
nonetheless, the correlation between the actual and expected rates
of change would be unity, since the actual and anticipated rates of
change would differ by a constant amount. Generally, the respond-
ent's bias might involve not only a constant but also a multiplicative
factor, because, if the actual rate of change were any linear function
of the anticipated rate of change, the two series• would be perfectly
correlated. On the other hand, the average error of column 2 would
be zero only if this linear function were characterized by a zero
constant term and a slope of unity.
It will be recognized that a test based on the correlation of the
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actual and anticipated rates of change is primarily an answer to
the second of the two questions we have raised as to the forecasting
value of Our first question, it will be remembered,
was whether anticipations represent good forecasts, per Se. The
tests we have described earlier have been aimed at throwing light
on this question. Our second question was whether one might,
through some simple manipulation, utilize the respondents' antici-
pation for a direct forecast of the variable covered by the anticipa-
tion. The correlation tests, the result of which we are about to re-
port, will at least partly answer the second question; it is clear that
a high correlation between the actual and anticipated rates of
change would indicate that we might secure a good forecast of the
actual rate of change by basing our forecast on a function of the
anticipated rate of change—in this case a linear function. The pa-
rameters of this linear function would be simpiy the parameters of
the regression equation.
In carrying out this test we must, unfortunately, cope with the
vexing problem of seasonal variation in the data. Clearly, the ratio
being the ratio of two consecutive quarters, is affected by
seasonal variation, which is marked in our data. Hence if we pro-
ceeded to correlate with without any adjustment for
seasonal change, we might well find a sizable positive correlation
arising simply from the fact that the shippers are able to estimate,
within reasonable limits, recurring seasonal changes. What we want
to know, however, is whether they are able to forecast changes other
than those arising from recurring seasonal fluctuations.
There are two ways in which we could handle the problem of
seasonal variations. The first method would be to adjust the data on
shipments and on anticipations for seasonal fluctuation and then
correlate the seasonally adjusted actual rate of change with the
seasonally adjusted anticipated ratechange. The main drawback
of this method is that there is at present no simple and reliable
method for carrying out the seasonal adjustment. The existing
methods are laborious and/or open to logical objections. They in-
volve considerable manipulation of the data, and the extent to which
such manipulations affect the results is frequently difficult to assess.
A second method. available to us, and not open to the above oh-
jections, is to separate the original fifty-eight observations into four
groups, according to the quarter of the calendar year to which each
observation refers, and to correlate each group separately. By this
means we avoid the difficulty of adjusting for seasonal variation,
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since each observation for any group will have the same seasonal
factor entering into it (assuming that this seasonal factor itself does
not change significantly from one year to another). The major draw-
back of this technique is the loss of efficiency due to the severe re-
cluction in the degrees of freedom. For our present purposes, how-
ever, since we have some thirteen or fourteen observations for each
of the four groups, we can probably afford this loss. We have, there-
fore, followed this method primarily, though some checks have been
carried out using the more conventional method of for
seasonal variation.
In table 7 we present the results of the test for the aggregate of all
manufactured commodities and for three selected industries, iron
and steel, cement, and lumber and forest products. In no case is
TABLE 7
Correlation of Actual and Anticipated Rates of Change of









First —0.13 —0.09 —0.429 0.05
Second —0.23 —0.31 0.27 —0.28
Third —0.43 0.07 0.38 —0.34
Fourth 0.44 0.14 0.52 —0.24
Allquarters—0.01 —0.04 0.19
Source: Compiled from data of regional Shippers' Advisory Boards, Associa-
tionAmerican Railroads. The 5 per cent level of r is 0.55 for the first quarter,
which is based on thirteen observations, and 0.53 for the remaining three
quarters, which are based on fourteen observations.
the correlation significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent
level of significance and in more than half of the instances it is
even negative. In the last row of the table we present the correla-
tion coefficients secured by adjusting the data for seasonal variation5
and combining all the quarterly observations. The correlations are,
again, close to zero. In other words, the shippers' survey appears to
be of little use in forecasting the rate of change of shipments.
In order to get a better understanding of the significance of these
results, it is worth pointing out that if instead of correlating the
5Therather crude seasonal adjustment used consists of dividing each observa-
tIon for a given quarter by the average value of for that quarter.
The latter ratio, it will be seen, provides a rough estimate of the normal seasonal
change from quarter f—i to quarter t.
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actual with the antiôipated rate of change we correlate the actual
with the anticipated level of shipments, we get strikingly different
results. These correlations are, in every case, very high; in the case
of the four industries of table 7 they range from a minimum of 0.86
for iron and steel to as high as 0.965 for cement. The results of
table 7 show that this high correlation between actual and forecast
levels is fully accounted for by the high serial correlation and by
the sharp, recurring seasonal fluctuations that characterize our
quarterly data over the period of observation. Once we eliminate
the influence of these two factors, we find that the shippers' antici-
pations have little to offer as a direct forecast of future shipments.
In conclusion, our analysis indicates that the shippers' anticipa-
tions did not provide, in the interwar period, very accurate fore-
casts of shipments, and that simple mechanical extrapolation models
would have done, on the whole, no worse than a forecast based on
the shippers' survey.
2. THE POSTWAR PERIOD
Several considerations make it desirable to analyze the interwar
and postwar periods separately. In the postwar period we have, in
addition to the shippers' forecast, the two other sources of data on
anticipations described in section B; hence it is clearly desirable to
compare the behavior of these series over the overlapping period.
In addition the postwar years constitute, undoubtedly, a rather ab-
normal period,, with characteristics different from those of the inter-
war period; it is conceivable, therefore, that the- forecasting value
of the shippers' antiqipations might be considerably affected. Dif-
ferences might also occur because the quality of the shippers' fore-
casts might have improved (or deteriorated) in time.
A systematic comparison of data from the three sources is diffi-
cult because of the differences in the nature of the surveys, and
especially because of differences in the form of the questions. As
far as we have been able to ascertain, the Shippers' Advisory Board
procedure was essentially the same in the postwar as in the prewar
period, so no new problem arises there. The Fortune and Dun &
Bradstreet surveys, on the other hand, impose the additional prob-
lem of securing data from outside sources in order to test the ac-
curacy of their fOrecasts. One other complication arises in connec-
tion with the Dun & Bradstreet survey: the length of the period
forecast by the respondents has varied from time to time.
Another important difference in the three surveys is in their coy-
286EXPECTATIONS AND PLANS OF FIRMS
erage. The shippers' forecasts included in our analysis refer only to
certain manufactured commodities. The survey of Dun & Brad-
street, on the other hand, covers all manufacturers, retailers, and
wholesalers, but our analysis is limited to retail trade and manu-
facturing industries. The Fortune survey has still broader coverage,
including, in addition to the types of activity already mentioned,
finance, transportation, public utilities, service industries, construc-
tion, advertising, radio, and publishing. Of these, only the follow-
ing will be covered in this analysis: manufacturing, wholesale and
retail trade, and, to a minor extent, mining and utilities.
Because of the differences in the nature of the surveys, it is not
possible to apply the same procedure to every source. We have
tried, however, as far as possible, to apply to all data the same gen-
eral types of test that were applied in the previous seótion to the
shippers' data.
The first test consists in analyzing the behavior of the percentage
error of forecast; the results are reported in table 8. The measures
given in columns S to 7 are the same as those presented for the inter-
war period in table 6 and were computed according to the pro-
cedure described above. The only difference is that periods of
"level" and "falling" activity have been lumped together, there be-
ing too few observations to compute meaningful separate means.
The similarity between the first row of part A of table 8 and the
comparable first row of table 6 is striking. As in the interwar period,
the forecast tended on the average to overestimate shipments slight-
ly. This tendency is concentrated in quarters in which shipments
were level or falling. In quarters of rising shipments, on the other
hand, we observe an underestimate of the same order of magnitude.
The average absolute percentage error, shown in column 6, is some-
what smaller than in the interwar period. This decline appears,
however, to be due primarily to the fact that in the postwar period
shipments exhibited less pronounced fluctuations than they did in
the thirties. This is brought out by the value of the absolute per-
centage error of the naïve model, an error which, it will be recalled,
is basically a measure of the variability of the series being forecast.
For purposes of our naïve model test we found it necessary to
eliminate the first seven postwar quarters, since during the war and
until the end of 1945 the classification used by the shippers' survey
was different from that used in the interwar period and reintro-
duced in the first quarter of 1946. In addition, shipments in the































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)EXPECTATIONS AND PLANS OF FIRMS
automobile industry. Hence the first postwar quarter that could be
used in the model was the second quarter of 1946. But the naïve
model requires knowledge of in order to forecast At; hence
the first quarter that could be forecast by use of this model was the
third quarter of 1947.
For the remaining fourteen quarters the average error of the
naïve model is only 5.4 per cent, or about half as large as in the
interwar period. For the same period the shippers' error of fore-
cast, while sizably smaller than for the interwar period, is once
more surprisingly larger than that of the naïve model. The coeffi-
cient of relative accuracy (column 8) shows, in fact, that the post-
war forecasts are about as poor, on the• basis 'of this test, as those
of the interwar period.
In the remaining rows of part A of table 8 we give results of the
naïve model test for selected industries. In general the forecasting
record is significantly better than that shown in table 6, although
the industry ranking according to accuracy remains approximately
the same. Here, for the first time, we find some evidence of. th.e
shippers' forecasts performing better than a mechanical extrapola-
tion formula. For flour, meal, etc. the margin is substantial.6
It may seem surprising that the record for each individual industry
was better than for the aggregate of all industries. A similar phe-
nomenon appeared to a lesser degree even in the interwar period,
for, of the five selected. industries, only one performed much worse
than the aggregate, while three had a significantly surperior record.
Intuitively, one might expect the opposite. It is easy to see how a
substantial error for individual industries might be consistent with
a small error for the aggregate since errors in opposite directions
might cancel out in the aggregation process; but it is, at first sight,
difficult to understand how relatively good forecasts of individual
industries can be consistent with the poor forecast of the aggregate.
One possible explanation is that the five industries that we selected
have a better than average forecasting record. While this may partly
be the case, it should be emphasized that the coefficient of relative
6Foriron and steel the shippers' forecast also performed substantially better
than the naïve model. This superiority may, however, be rather misleading
because of the effects on 'the naïve model of the steelS strike in the fourth
quarter of 1949. For this reason the iron and steel industry was omitted from
table 8. It might be noted in this connection that if, for agricultural implements,
we eliminate the first five quarters, which were presumably seriously affected
by reconversion problems, the shippers' error falls from 13.1 as shown in table
8 to only 6.7 and the coefficient of relative accuracy rises from —0.16 to 0.41.
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accuracy of the aggregate might well be less than that of each
component series. This possibility arises from the fact that indi-
vidual components will typically exhibit greater variability than an
aggregate. It should also be noted that to the extent that the agency
conducting. the shippers' survey is interested in the shipments of
individual industries in individual regions, rather than in aggregate
shipments of all industries, the. survey may. provide it with valuable
information. Nonetheless, the analysis of the postwar record is
further evidence that the shippers' expectations are of little use as a
direct forecast of aggregate shipments.
Our analysis of the eight semiannual sales forecasts collected
through the Fortune survey is given in table 8, part B. For each of
the four individual industries listed, the ratio of forecast to actual
sales, was computed by estimating the average expected
change (for method see above, 'section B 2), and
dividing the resulting estimate of by the actual
change in Seasonally adjusted data were used for reasons
givensection B 2 above. Our estimates of the average anticipated
change in sales are reproduced in the Appendix. They are also
shown in chart 2 (shaded bars), together with the actual change in
sales (black bars).
For the private sector of national income, which appears in the
last row of part B of table 8, the anticipated rate of change was se-
cured by a more complex procedure. First, the average anticipated
rate of change was computed for two additional industries, mining
and public utilities. Next, the average anticipated change for each
of the six industries was weighted by the industry's contribution to
national income. Data for 19498 were used, though the choice of
any other year would not materially affect the results. Since the six
industries covered accounted for nearly 60 per cent of national in-
come produced by all prfvate industries, the weighted average an-
ticipation computed in this fashion can be regarded as a measure
of the implicit anticipated change in the private sector of national
income. (It should be noted that the Fortune respondents were
also asked explicit questions as to their anticipation of change in
gross national product. Our measure of implicit anticipated change
in the private sector of national income should not be confused
See Survey of Current Business (Department of Commerce), October 1950,
p. 20, for data through 1949; current issues for data through 1950.
8Asgiven in Survey of Current Business, National Income Supplement
(Department of Commerce), July 1950, table 13, p. 15.
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Figure1: Changes in Sales, Selected Industries
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Figure II:Changes in National Income (Private Sector)EXPECTATIONS AND PLANS OF FIRMS
with the average explicit anticipated change in gross national prod-
uct.) This implicit anticipated change was then related to the actual
change in the private sector of national income (seasonally ad-
justed)Therelationship is shown in figure II of chart 2.10
Acursory inspection of chart 2 will suggest that the forecasting
record of the Fortune respondents is superior to that of the Ship-
pers' Advisory Boards. In the entire record of eight forecasts for
four individual industries, we note oniy one really serious failure,
namely, the forecasts for the second half of 1947. For this period,
respondents in every industry expected on the average a mild con-
traction, which definitely failed to materialize. Except for this fail-
ure, however, the record is rather respectable. It should be noted
in particular that the anticipations for durable and nondurable
manufacturing industries, as well as the implicit forecast of the
private sector of national income, predicted correctly the direction
of change in every one of the remaining seven semiannual periods.
The correct forecast made early in November 1948 of a contraction
for the first half of 1949 is especially worth noting, considering that
sales in October. 1948 were at an all-time peak and, in the case of
durable goods, had been rising in the immediately previous month.
Equally impressive is the forecast for the first half of 1950, made
after sales had been falling in the immediately preceding months
and while they were still generally falling.
At the same time it appears that throughout the postwar period
the Fortune respondents tended to be too pessimistic. Not only did
they forecast a contraction for the second half of 1947 that did not
occur, but furthermore, on the average, they underestimated ex-
pansion in almost every instance in which expansion actually took
place, and they overestimated contraction in several instances, not-
ably for the second half of 1949.
These general impressions, suggested by chart 2, are confirmed
by the more precise analysis of table 8, part B. First, turning to
column 8, which shows the average percentage error of forecast
for the whole period covered, we find that for every one of the
°Itwould have been desirable, also, to compare the implicit anticipated
change with the actual change in national income originating in the six indus-
tries, but unfortunately the necessary national income information is not avail-
able on a semiannual basis.
10Theanticipated change for the first half of 1947 is a crude estimate, not
strictly comparable with the other estimates because the question of sales
expectations was formulated in a somewhat different form; no information is
available for mining; and wholesale and retail trade were lumped into a single
category.
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industries, analyzed the error is negative, indicating an average
underestimate. This underestimate was as high as 7 per cent for
durable manufactures and 4. per cent for every other industry. It
contrasts strangely with the average overestimate ofper cent
which we find for the shippers' forecasts. Turning to columns 4
and. 5, we observe again that in periods of rising activity the tend-
ency to underestimate is pronounced. However, in periods of level
or falling activity there is little tendency to overestimate. In fact
the average error is remarkably close to zero, though there are too
few observations to draw any reliable conclusions. The average ab-
solute error of forecast shown in column 6 is appreciably smaller
than we have tended to find for the shippers' survey, with the single
exception of the durable goods industries. This exception is sig-
nificant, however, since the shippers' survey is heavily weighted
with durable goods. For retail trade, on the other hand, and for
the private sector of national income, the error is only about two-
thirds as large. Once more we may suspect that variations in the
average error are related to the underlying variability of the series
forecast, and this suspicion is, infact,broadly confirmed by the
naïve model test, as seen in columns 7 and 8.
Since we are now dealing with seasonally adjusted data, we are'
able to use a simpler naïve model than that used previously, namely,
a simple extrapolation of the latest, seasonally adjusted level. In
other words, our naïve model forecast reduces to
(3)
The average absolute error of the naïve model is thus given by







This erroT, which is shown in column 7, is therefore simply the
ave:rage absolute semiannual rate of change. There is, clearly, a
strong association between the average absolute error of respond-
ents' forecasts and this measure. At the same time, as we should
expect from our analysis of chart 2, it .appears that the change an-
ticipated by the respondents has been, in general, a better forecast
than a simple extrapolation of the past. Indeed, the respondents'
fOrecasts for the durable goods industries and their implicit fore-
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cast of the private sector of national income turn out to be some
20 per cent more accurate than the naïve model's. The only nega-
tive coeflicient of accuracy is for retail trade. Although the re-
spondents in this 'industry made the .smallest average absolute
error, the series they were forecasting was so stable in this period
that an extrapolation of level would have yielded considerably more
accurate, forecasts.
For Dun & Bradstreet our tests were based on only eight of the
sixteen surveys conducted to date by that agency. In order to main-
tamcomparability with our other sources in terms •f period cov-
ered, we have not included in our analysis the last three surveys,
relating respectively to the first, second, and third quarters of 1951.
We have also omitted the first survey, made in the spring of 1947,
since it was based on a very small sample and in several respects
is not comparable with later surveys. Of the twelve remaining sur-
veys it appeared desirable 'to discard four additional ones because
they were taken within a short period of time." The eight surveys
used are listed in table 9.
The ratios of expected to actual sales were secured, as for the
Fortune data, by dividing the anticipated by th'e actual change.
With minor exceptions the average expected change for these sur-
veys is the unweighted median, as computed by Dun & Bradstreet
and published in their releases.12
Since expected sales are reported as percentage changes relative
to sales in the corresponding period of the year before, we com-




Theinclusion in our analysis of every one of the four surveys conducted
between April arid June 1949 would give undue weight in the Dun & Bradstreet
sample to anticipations formed in the second quarter of 1949. Of these surveys
we have included, therefore, only the first and last, which were conducted
roughly three months apart. Their timing agrees more closely with the shippers'
and Fortune surveys. Surveys 7 and 9 were eliminated for analogous reasons.
12Theexceptions are as follows; For survey 2 the average, expected change
for the two manufacturing industries represented is the unweighted arithmetic
average computed from information supplied by Dun & Bradstreet. No cone-
sponding information was available for retail trade and, therefore, for this
industry, survey 2 is not included in the computations of table 8. for
survey 13 the average expected change is an unweighted median estimated by
us on the basis of incomplete information.
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Here et is the average expected change andand respec-
tively, denote actual sales for the period -forecast and for the cor-
responding period of the year
When we examine- the results of our analysis presented in table 8,
it appears that the forecasting record of the Dun & Bradstreet sur-
vey is decidedly worse than that of the Fortune 'survey, and similar
in many respects to that of the shippers' survey. Once more we
observe the familiar tendency to overestimate sales in level or fall-
ing periods and to underestimate them in rising periods. However,
TABLE 9
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a Reference numbers are our own, since no identifying numbers are provided
by the agency conducting the survey. --
Source:Compiled from data of Dun & Bradstreet.
13Thusthe ratio of anticipated to actual sates is obtained for survey 2 by
dividing one plus the average expected change by the ratio of 1948 sales to
1947 sales; for survey 3, by dividing one p'us the -averageexpected change
by the ratio of sales in the second half of 1949sales of the second half of
1948, and so on.
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in the present case, both overestimates and underestimates are far
more pronounced than those of Fortune, especially in the caseof
durable goods. The average absolute error of forecast, except for
retail trade, is large both absolutely and relative to the other sur-
veys (see column 6).
These unfavorable conclusions are fully confirmed by our naïve
model tests. As in the case of Fortune, the naïve model forecast is
an extrapolation of the latest level of sales, seasonally adjusted:
(6)
The reference period, t—1, was taken for this purpose as the
latest three months immediately preceding the' date of the survey;
these reference periods are specifically indicated in column 4 of
table 9. When the respondents were asked to forecast for a period
longer than a quarter, as in surveys 2, 3, and 6, an appropriate
multiple, K, of the reference period was used to compute Thus
the entries in column 7 of table 8 for Dun & Bradstreet can be rigor-





Thismeans that in the case of Dun & Bradstreet we are compar-
ing the average absolute error of forecasts of the respondents with
the error that would have been made by extrapolating the latest
seasonally adjusted level of sales. We might add that tests were
also made for Dun & Bradstreet by employing the same naïve
model used to test the shippers' forecast, and the results do not
differ significantly from those reported in columns 7 and 8 of
table 8.
It is apparent from column 7 that for durable goods the excep-
tionally large error of the respondents is related in part to the
underlying variability of the series forecasted. But the respond-
ents' error is still substantially larger than that of the naïve model.
This is also true for nondurable goods and even for retail trade.
For the latter industry, however, the record of the Dun & Brad-
street respondents is at least not appreciably poorer than that of
the naïve model and -is therefore better than the record of the
Fortune respondents. On the whole, then, the tests of table 8 all
concur in indicating that the Dun & Bradstreet record is distinctly
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inferior to that of Fortune and is of the same general quality as
the shippers' forecasts.
Before we attempt to interpret this finding we shall discuss
briefly the results of our last test of accuracy, based on the corre-
lation between the actual and anticipated rates of change. It will
be recalled that when this correlation test was applied to the ship-
pers' anticipations in the interwar period, the results were most
disappointing. None of the correlation coefficients was significantly
different from zero, and a number of them were actually negative.
A similar test could not be applied to the shippers' forecasts in the
postwar period because we had no seasonally adjusted data, and it
was not possible to analyze each quarter separately because we
had only four or five observations for each quarter. No such prob-
lem arises, however, for the Fortune survey, where we can use
seasonally adjusted data. In this case, therefore, we proceeded to
correlate directly the average anticipated rate of change with the
actual rate of change. The correlation coefficients obtained by this
procedure are given in column 9 of' table 8.
For every one of the industries analyzed the correlation is now
positive; this is certainly a significant improvement over the ship-
pers' forecast in the interwar period. Unfortunately, these correla-
tions are all based on extremely few observations and therefore in-
volve few degrees of freedom—five for retail trade and six for each
of the other three industries. When this is taken, into account, it is
found that in terms of the usual statistical tests, none of these co-
efficients is significantly different from at the 1 per cent level,
and only one, that for durable goods, is significant at the 5 per
cent leveL
Of course, this negative result does not imply that there, is no
relation between actual and anticipated rates 'of change; it implies
only that the number of observations we have so far is too small to
permit us to conclude that the observed correlation may not be
due to chance. If the respondents' forecasts should maintain the
same record of quality in, 'say, five or six more surveys, the coeffi-
cient for the nondurable goods industries and for the private sector
of national income would also become significant.
It is doubtful, however, if the same record can be maintained.
During the period of observation the forecasts exhibit, as we have
seen, a pronounced downward bias; as long as this bias is constant
it does not affect the correlation. But if this tendency to underesti-
mate is itself related to the fact that the period covered by the data
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is dominated by periods of rising activity, then the correlations of
table 8 may have a definite upward bias. It is not unlikely, in other
words, that if the number of periods of rising and the number of
periods of falling activity were more evenly balanced, the record
would turnout to be less favorable. This, however, is pure specula-
tion. All we can say for the moment is that the Fortune record,
as a whole, is at least promising.
The record for Dun & Bradstreet is again impressively worse
than that for Fortune. For the two manufacturing industries the
correlation is practically zero. Only for retail trade does the Dun
& Bradstreet record come close to that of Fortune, and for this
sector this record is poor in both cases.
3. SOME POSSIBLE REASONS FOR DIFFERENCES IN THE FORECASTING
RECORDS OF SURVEYS EXAMINED
It seems appropriate at this point to venture some guesses as to
why the Dun & Bradstreet and shippers' surveys should present
rather poor, and in many respects similar, records, in contrast to
the superior record of the Fortune survey. The shippers' survey
differs in procedure from the Fortune survey in two major respects:
1. In the shippers' survey the persons interviewed are primarily
traffic managers; in the Fortune survey they are top executives.
From information in one of the Fortune surveys about the
position of the respondents in their respective firms, we know that
46 per cent of them were presidents, 25 per cent vice-presidents,
and another 15 per cent were department heads, managers, treas-
urers, and chairmen of the boards. Obviously, this is a survey of
the top brass of the American economy. It is certainly conceivable
that traffic managers might be less well acquainted with the plans
of the firm and less forward-looking than the Fortune responderits.
2. The Fortune survey has asked for anticipations for the next
half year relative to the current half year, while the shippers' sur-
vey asks for anticipations for the next quarter and for actual ship-
ments in the corresponding period of the year before.
In the case of Dun & Bradstreet we have no specific information
about the position of the respondents in their firms, though we be-
lieve that in this respect this survey comes closer to Fortune than
to the shippers' survey. However, as indicated earlier, the average
size of the responding concerns is smaller for Dun & Bradstreet;
and we have some indications, to be discussed presently, that
smaller áoncerns have the poorer forecasting record. Further, the
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Dun & Bradstreet survey is definitely much closer to the shippers'
survey than to that of Fortune in that the respondents are asked for
expectations of change in the succeeding period relative to the cor-
responding period of the year before; and for five of the observa-
tions included in our Dun & Bradstreet sample this period is one
quarter, just as in the shippers' survey.
While any one of the differences we have mentioned may be
responsible for the obvious differences in the quality of the fore-
casts, we suspect that the most important single factor is the dif-
ference in the time-reference for the anticipated change. The valida-
tion of this hypothesis will require more intensive analysis than we
have been able to carry out so far or to discuss in this paper.
However, we should like to present here a few suggestive bits of
evidence.
An intensive analysis of the shippers' forecasts from 1928 to date
strongly supports the hypothesis that the forecasts are made on the
basis of the corresponding quarter of the year before and that this
method exerts a profound influence on the nature of the forecasts.
As shown more fully in Robert Ferber's "Railroad Shippers' Fore-
casts," mentioned earlier, these forecasts can be accounted for re-
markably well by a simpl.e formula. This formula is similar to the
naïve model we have used to test the accuracy of the shippers'
forecasts (formula 1), but it differs in one essential respect. Our
naïve model forecast can be reduced to the statement that the
change for the coming quarter relative to the corresponding quarter
of the year before will be equal to the change that has occurred
between the current quarter and the corresponding quarter of the
year before. The shippers, on the other hand, tend on the average
to forecast that the change for the coming quarter relative to the
corresponding quarter of the year before will be about 40 per cent
of the change that has occurred in the past year. In periods of rising
activity such forecasts appear prima facie to be optimistic, since
they predict a rise relative to the year before; but in reality they
imply that shipments will regress from the latest level toward the
lower level which prevailed in the period of reference.14
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In periods .of decreasing activity the regressive character of the
forecasts operates in the opposite direction. The shippers will tend
to forecast a decrease relative to the year before. When adjustment
is made for the change that has already occurred in the past year,
the forecast will generally imply an actual increase over the latest
quarter. This means that while prima facie the shippers appear to
forecast in the direction of the trend, when adjustment is made for
the reference point, they generally turn out to be forecasting against
the recent trend. These considerations, incidentally, go a long way
toward explaining why, for the shippers' survey, the correlation
between the actual and anticipated rates of change turns out to be
negative in many instances. The point is that actual shipments are,
on the average, more likely to continue the recent trend than to
move against it, as the shippers tend to forecast.
When we analyze the Dun & Bradstreet survey and compare its
response with that of the Fortune survey, much the same phenome-
non comes to light. This is brought out rather strikingly in chart 3,
which compares what the two surveys report on average change
expected in the durable goods industry. The average change ex-
pected by Dun & Bradstreet respondents is also shown after ad-
to the base used by Fortune.
When we compare the two surveys without any adjustment for
differences in the content of the questions asked, we find substan-
tial agreement, at least in the direction of expected change, How-
ever, for all but one of the periods for which comparison is possible
the adjustment of the Dun & Bradstreet response reverses the direc-
tion of the average expected change and destroys the apparent
similarity of the responses to the two surveys. From what we know
of the history of general business sentiment in the period covered,
we are inclined to feel that, by and large, the Fortune response
and the Dun & Bradstreet unadjusted response give a more accurate
picture of expected changes in existing levels of business activity
than that given by the Dun & Bradstreet adjusted response. It
should be noted, besides, that in every case in which the adjust-
ment reverses the direction of expected change, the actual change
was in the direction expected by the Fortune respondents.
These facts, though not conclusive, suggest that a major factor
responsibl.e for the poorer forecasting record of the Dun & Brad-
street and shippers' surveys, as compared with the Fortune survey,
is that those surveys ask for change expected relative to the same
period of a year ago. Respondents seem to be generally unable to
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adjust adequately for the amount of change that has alreadyoc-
curred since the previous Indeed, from the analysis we have
conducted so far, of which chart 3 is Only a sample,we think that
the unadjusted reply to the Dun & Bradstreetsurvey is more a
Fortunesurvey
________
Dun and Bradstreet survey (unadjusted)
Dun and Bradstreet survey (adjusted 10 base
Chart 3. Comparison of Forecasts, Average Expected Changes in Sales, Durable
Goods Industry, 1948-1950
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measure of change expected relative to an immediately preceding
•period than of change relative to the same period of a year ago,
the specific reference point indicated on the questionnaire. In other
words, we think that, on the average, the respondents are not really
replying to the question as worded, but are (perhaps subconscious-
ly) answering a. question more like the one submitted to the For-
tune respondents. If this is so, the unadjusted Dun & Bradstreet
expected change would be roughly comparable to the Fortune
response, and the Dun & Bradstreet quarterly surveys that do
not overlap the Fortune survey might be used to interpolate be-
tween the semiannual Fortune surveys. This procedure will actually
be used in parts of the analysis presented in section D.
4. How WELL DO FIRMS FORECAST THEIR OWN SALES?
A CROSS-SECIION ANALYSIS
In the foregoing discussion we have been concerned exclusively
with the question, How well does the average expectation of firms
forecast aggregate sales? We have paid no attention to another
question which might be raised in connection with an evaluation
of expectations, i.e. How well do anticipations of individual firms
forecast the firms' own sales? The answers 'tO the two questions
could be quite different. To see this point clearly, let us think of
the change in the sales of a given firm as consisting of two com-
ponents: the change in the total sales of the industry and the change
in the share of the total accounted for by the given firm. Especially
when the change in total sales is not very pronounced, the second
component is likely to be the more important for individual firms,
although the (weighted) sum of this second component must, of
course, be zero for all firms taken together. If, then, firms are able
to judge accurately changes in their relative position, this may be
enough to produce a fair agreement between forecast and actual
changes in their own sales, even if they largely fail in estimating the
first component. On the other hand, the average expected change
can be a good forecast of the industry's total change in sales only
if firms are able to form a good judgment as to the first component.
It is, therefore, possible for anticipations of individual firms to pro-
vide reasonably good forecasts of the firm's own sales while at the
same time the average expectation provides a poor forecast of ag-
gregate sales, .and vice versa. Evidence that this possibility is not"
just a theoretical one was provided by some of our results in con-
nection with the shippers' survey; it will be recalled that individual
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industries tended to have a better forecasting record than the ag-
gregate of all industries.
For our present analysis we require, information, on anticipated
and actual sales of individual respondents. The shippers' survey
cannot be utilized since it gives information on aggregate expecta-
tions and aggregate shipments only)'5 In the case of the Fortune
and Dun & Bradstreet surveys we have anticipations of, individual
respondents but no matching information on the actual sales of
these respondents for the period covered by the forecast.
There is, however, another source of information on anticipations:
the survey of anticipated capital expenditures conducted" jointly by
the Office of Business Economics, Department of Commerce, and
the Securities and Exchange Commission. This survey, at least since
1948, has requested the respondents to indicate, early in the first
quarter of each year, sales anticipated for that year as well as actual
sales for the year before. By matching the returns of the same re-
spondents in successive years, one can secure information on the an-
ticipated an& actual sales of a sample àf firms. Unfortunately, we
have not had direct access to these data because of their confi-
dential character. However, we are able to quote the results of a
few tabulations and computations that the Department of Com-
merce kindly prepared for us.16
The first question on which we have some information is that
of the correlation between anticipated and actual sales. Selected
results are presented in column 4 of table 10 for the years 1948
and 1949.
The coefficients of correlation between actual and anticipated
rates of change are in every case positive. While these coefficients
are not high, they are nonetheless respectable, considering that we
are dealing with cross-section data and with a fairly large number
of observations. In' fact all but one of them are significant at the
1 per cent level. The exception is the coefficient for the finns of
asset sizes 1 and 2, and it is still significant at the 2 per cent levël.17
15 Certain Shippers' Advisory Boards have kept records of the actual and
expected shipments of individual respondents, but we have been unable to
secure this data.
16 These tabulations were prepared in accordance with an agreement with the
Office of Business Economics of the Department of Commerce for a cooperative
study of the above survey data. Under this agreement a member of our staff,
.Jean Bronfenbrenner, joined the Department of Commerce for an eighteen..
month period, utilizing funds supplied by our
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It will also be observed that for 1948 there is a pronounced posi-
tive association between the ability of firms to forecast (as meas-
ured by the correlation coemcient) and the size of the firms. This
relationship, incidentally, might be one of the factors accounting
for the better forecasting record of the Fortune as against the Dun
& respondents.
As we have pointed out, the signfficant correlations of column 4
might reflect the ability of the firms to forecast their relative posi-
tion only and not an ability to forecast movements of the entire
industry or economy. To what extent this is true can be judged
partly by the figures reported in columns 5, 6, and 7 of table 10.
The relationship between the data reported in column 5 and
those reported in column 6 suggests that the correlations of column
4 are not completely accounted for by the ability of firms to fore-
cast their relative position. For 1948 respondents on the average
anticipated a significant increase in sales, while for 1949 a decrease
in sales was expected by all respondents except firms of asset sizes
5 and 6. With this exception the forecast direction of change agrees,
in both years, with the actual direction of It is also inter-
esting to note that there seems to be a fair relation between the
anticipated and actual rates of change as between asset size groups.
Thus in 1948 the firms of asset sizes 5 and 6, which made the high-
est forecast, actually realized the largest increase in sales; while
those of sizes 1 and 2, which forecast the smallest increase, also
realized the smallest increase. For 1949 the same pattern holds,
even though the larger firms missed the direction of change.
The comparison of columns 5 and 6 brings to light once more a
phenomenon with which we have grown familiar: respondents,
even when they accurately forecast the direction of change, tend
18Thefact that firms were able to anticipate the broad movements correctly,
at least to some extent, suggests that the correlations of column 4 might be due
to this ability rather than to the ability to forecast accurately their own indi-
vidual sales. This hypothesis might be tested by correlating the anticipated
change in sales with the "relative" change in sales, that is to say, with the
change in sales relative to the industry to which the firm belongs. The firm's
change relative to the industry can be approximated by dividing the actual
change in sales of the firm by the corresponding change in the total sales of the
industry. If the accuracy of the firms' forecasts was due primarily to their
ability to forecast the broad changes of the entire industry, rather than their
own individual sales, then the correlation of the anticipated change in sales with
the relative change should be lower than the correlation shown in column 4.
One test of this hypothesis was carried out for the firms of asset sizes 5 and 6
for the year 1949. The correlation, which turns out to be 0.44, is clearly not
significantly different from the coefficient of 0.45 shown in column 4 for the
same sample.
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to underestimate sales when sales are rising, and to overestimate
them when they are falling. It will also be noted that, by and
large, the average expectation of the respondents to the survey
under consideration bears a reasonable resemblance to the antici-
pations reported by the Fortune respondents in the surveys con-
ducted at approximately the same time. Since the OBE-SEC sur-
vey is taken in February, it falls midway between the November
and May surveys of FOrtune.Ifwe average the sales expectations
of the Fortune respondents in the November 1947 and May 1948
surveys, we get, for all manufacturing industries, an average ex-
pected increase of 2.7 per cent, compared with an average
crease of 3.9 per cent expected by all respondents to the 013E-SEC
survey.Similarly, averaging the Fortune surveys of November
1948 and May 1949, we get an average anticipated decline of 4.9
per cent, as against an expected decline of 2.6 per cent in the OBE-
SEC survey. This comparison is, of course, very rough because of
differences in. both the time of survey and the specific content of
the question on anticipation. Nonetheless, this similarity in reply,
as well as the accuracy in forecasting the direction of change, is
worth noting, especially when we observe that the anticipation ques-
tion of the OBE-SEC survey does not involve reference to the cor-
responding period of the year before, but refers to the entire year.
5. TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS
It would be unwise to form any firm conclusions from the analy-
sis presented in the previous pages. Nevertheless we shall summa-
rize briefly the results reached so far and suggest some tentative
conclusions.
Of the four surveys analyzed two, the shippers' survey and the
Dun & Bradstreet survey, have shown a poor record with regard
to direct forecasting ability. In the case of the other two surveys
analyzed the forecasting record, even if not brilliant, is certainly
not to be passed over lightly. We are not in a position to advance
any well-established explanation for these differences. It is not im-
possible that they might be due only to chance or to the peculiari-
ties of the period of observation. However, our tentative conclusion
is that, at least to some extent, the differences result from sys-
tematic factors, of which an important one is the way in which the
question on anticipation is put. In the two surveys with the poorer
record, reference to the coriesponding period of the year before
seems to impart a regressive character to the respondent's reply,
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and this influence seems to play havoc with the direct forecasting
values of the reply. It is not impossible, however, that with more
experience one might learn to adjust for this phenomenon. For
instance, we have suggested earlier that in the case of Dun & Brad-
street the unadjusted reply might represent a more accurate meas-
ure of the expected change from current levels than would be
obtained by assuming that the respondent is actually answering the
specific question posed to him.
All our survey data constantly exhibit a bias in underestimating
the magnitude of change, especially when change is at all sub-
stantial. This tendency to underestimate is one of the major ele-
ments contributing to the average error, which was sizable even
for the two more successful surveys. Again, with further experience
one might well learn to make proper allowance for biases such as
this if they are really constant over time, This means that the fore-
casting value of the anticipations might be considerably enhanced
if instead of basing forecasts directly on the response we used some
function, of the average expected change, which function would
make allowance for any systematic bias. Some of the correlation
coefficients presented in earlier tables suggest that there may be
real possibilities in thi.s direction.
When we first undertook the analysis presented in section C, we
had a strong a priori feeling that it would reveal business expecta-
tions to be of absolutely no forecasting value. Perhaps this expecta-
tion was partly prompted by the fact that the record of economists
with regard to unconditional forecasting has been far from brilliant.
At this stage of the analysis our a priori conviction is, to say the
least, somewhat shaken. It is possible that surveys of expectations
might turn out to be a tool of considerable direct forecasting value.
Even in this case, however, it is likely that the greatest value of
survey information on anticipations will be an indirect one—that of
supplying one of the ingredients with which we may hope some-
time to turn out better forecasts. It is to this aspect of the problem
that we now turn.
D. Can Sales Anticipations Be Used to
Forecast Variables Other than Sales?
1. SEITING OF THEPROBLEM
Regardless of whether sales (or shipments) anticipationsfirms,
as ascertained by survey techniques, can be used directly to fore-
cast sales, one might expect that appropriately designed samples
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of the operating expectations of firms would yield information useful
in short-term forecasting of the movements of such variables as pro-
duction, inventories, and outlays on fixed capital..
At any given point of time the activity of the firm is not entirely
directed to the immediate problem of supplying current sales. Pro-
duction for stocks, and outlays on fixed plant and equipment, are
clear instances of activities that are controlled, at least to some ex-
tent, by anticipations. Indeed, one might argue that in an economic
system of the American type—where production is largely for the
market and less for specific orders—anticipations control, at least in
the short run, most of the activity of the firm. In other words, not
only capital outlays, but production itself, must really depend on
sales expected in the future, though possibly only in the very near
future.
The above argument, however, does not warrant the conclusion
that anticipations and plans are useful for forecasting future pro-
duction. Current production might well be controlled by current
anticipations, but future production will depend on future expec-
tations, and these are, of course, just as unknown at the present
time as the future rate of production. Nevertheless, current antici-
pations and plans might still possess forecasting value, should there
be rigidity in expectations and
plan asales forecast made once every
quarter and not subject to revision within the quarter. In such a
case, information on anticipations and plans as of the beginning
of the quarter would enable us to forecast anticipations and plans
as of any other point in the quarter.
Rigidity might occur for several reasons. Production and at least
some of the other activities indicated above require a certain amount
of forward planning and cannot be continuously and immediately
adlusted. In many cases the inflow of materials must itself be sched-
uled and cannot be suddenly stepped up or down. Contracts may
have to be made which cannot be canceled easily. Similarly, man-
power and productive facilities cannot be secured at a moment's
notice.
With regard to those activities not directly keyed to the supply-
ing of immediate sales but based on expectations for rather long
periods, as is the case with capital outlays, it is not likely that such
19Thispoint has been developed by Franco Modigliani in hispaper"Use of
Survey Data of Entrepreneurial Anticipations and Plans," presented at the
Chicago meeting of the Econometric Society, December 1950.
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expectations will be seriàusly affected by current events, unless
such current events are of a rather spectacular character. Further,
it is not likely that minor revisions in these expectations would lead
to wholesale revisions of plans, except under rather exceptional
circumstances.
These considerations lead us to the hypothesis that expectations
and plans of firms, when taken in conjunction with other relevant
variables, might contribute to the short-run forecasting of certain
aspects of the activity of such firms. Clearly, the validity of this
hypothesis can be established only by empirical investigation.
As we have argued, the variables most likely to be related to
anticipations and plans are production, inventories, and capital out-
lays. Since the field of capital outlays is being covered in several
other papers in this volume, we shall concentrate on the fields of
production and inventories. We shall direct our attention primarily
to manufacturing industries, since only there can we properly speak
of production. However, it is our plan to extend our analysis eventu-
ally to every field of economic activity in which inventories, or
stocks, play a significant role.
2. INTERRELATION OF PRODUCrION, STOCKS, AND EXPECTATIONS:
SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS AND AN ANALYTICAL MODEL
The starting point of our analysisis the almost self-evident
hypothesis that production in the short run, say over a period of a
few months, will depend not only on sales of the firm during the
period, but also on initial stocks and the amount of stocks that the
firm would find it advisable to hold on the basis of its anticipations
for the future. Hence the study of factors controlling the rate of
production in the short run involves the study of what we may call
the "inventory holding function," i.e. the relationship between the
volume of inventories which the firm would want to hold and the
information available to the firm. This information would include
the firm's anticipations for the future.
We shall start by developing some general considerations as to
the factors likely to control the desired level of inventories in manu-
facturing industries. These considerations will apply primarily to
stocks of finished commodities, though they also have some appli-
cation to stocks of raw materials and goods in process.
We may conveniently distinguish three major sets of factors in-
fluencing the desired level of inventories. First, the need of the
'firm to supply current orders promptly will impose a lower limit to
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the desired level of inventories. It is this factor that has been most
frequently stressed and analyzed; undoubtedly it is one of the most
important factors if not the most important factor in such industries
as wholesale and retail trade.
A second factor, which becomes important when one is con-
cerned with periods of less than a year, is the existence of seasonal
fluctuations in sales. This factor is likely to be especially important
in the case of manufacturing industries for which sales are charac-
terized by pronounced seasonal fluctuations and for which there
are economic advantages in running production at a relatively con-
stant rate throughout the year.
The third important factor is what we may call the "speculative
motive." Particularly for those industries in which it is difficult to
hedge through the use of organized forward markets, there will be
an incentive for firms to increase their stocks when they expect that
prices of their inputs and/or outputs will be rising in the future,
and to reduce stocks as far as possible when they expect that these
prices will be falling.
Since the influence of the last factor does not require further
elaboration, and since the significance of the first has already been
extensively investigated,20 we shall devote our analysis particularly
to the second.
Clearly, if a function of inventories is that of enabling the firm
to produce at a rate more stable than the rate of shipments, then
inventories will not bear a constant relation to sales. By and large,
we should expect inventories to reach a peak shortly before the
heavy shipment season, to decline thereafter until the end of this.
season, and then to rise again. In other words, the relation between
inventories and sales, as measured by the ratio of stocks at the end
of a month to sales in the month, will vary considerably throughout
the year. Indeed, inventories will tend to trace a cycle roughly in-
verse to that of shipments, though the exact nature of the relation
will depend, of course, on the specific seasonal pattern of ship-
ments. This type of pattern is very clearly illustrated in chart 4.
The solid line in this chart shows average monthly shipments of
cement for the whole industry, the average being computed for the
twenty-one-year period from 1928 to 1949. The broken line shows
20Animportant recent contribution to the subject is to be found in the paper
"Optimal Inventory Policy" by Messrs: Arrow, Harris, and Marschak, in Econo-
metrica, Vol. 19 (July .1951), pp. 250, 272. This paper also includes a valuable
bibliography on the subject.
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the average level of stocks at the end of each month during the same
period.
Starting from these general observations, we may formulate an
analytical model relating shipments to stocks, anticipations, and
errors in anticipations.





























Chart 4. Cement Industry, Average Monthly Shipments and Stocks (End
Month), 1928-1949
of
We shall define the production year as a fiscal year ending with
the close of the last period of heavy shipments. In the case of
cement, for instance, the industry considers the close of its ship-
ment year as being at the end of October, though for this particular
industry an equally satisfactory year would be one terminating at
the end of November. We may conceive of this fiscal year as di-
vided into a number of subperiods, which we shall call seasons. Such
seasons are marked off by the points of time at which major pro-
duction decisions and plans are typically made; the number of sea-
sons may differ from industry to industry, and the seasons need not
be of equal length for the same industry. Our purpose is to derive
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a model which will acc6unt for the level of inventories held at the
end of each season.
Let zdenotethe number of seasons in the fiscal year. These sea-
sons will be marked off by zcalendardates, say t0, t1, ...
ti_i,=to.The ith season will be defined as the ith period follow-
ing the date t0, and will be marked off by dates andThe
level of inventories at any point of time will be denoted by H (t),
so that inventories at the end of the ith period will be H (t4).In
general we shall simplify our notation by replacing the symbol
by i itself, since this will not create any ambiguity. Thus the symbol
for stocks at the end of the ith period, i.e. will be abbreviated
to H(i).
We shall need in our model, in addition to stocks, certain flow
variables—production and sales. We shall denote respectively by
P (t)and S (t) the rate of production and shipments at point t.
However, since we 'are dealing with discrete intervals of time, all
we shall need are integrals of these variables over certain intervals.
instance, shipments in the ith season would be
fS(t)dt
ti_i
Thisintegral will be represented by the symbol S (i; i—i), the two
symbols in parentheses being, respectively, the time subscripts of
the upper and lower limits of integration. Similarly P (i;i—i) will
denote production in the ith season; and S (z; i—i)will denote ship-
ments from the beginning of the ith season to the end of the fiscal
year; and so on. Finally, we shall need symbols to denote expecta-
tions of production, sales, and inventories. For this purpose we
shall make use of the symbols which we have just introduced but
will append a subscript to denote the point of time at which such
anticipations or plans are made. Thus (i;i—i) will denote pro.-
duction for .the ith season planned at the beginning of that season;
and(z; i)will denote sales expectations held at the end of the
ith season for the remaining portion of the fiscal year.
We shall assume that for a given industry or, more specifically,
for a given firm there is an optimum way of distributing total pro-
ductionover the year. This optimum pattern of distribution will of
course depend on the technological and economic characteristics of
the firm and industry. At the beginning of any year the total amount
that a firm plans to produce during the year be equal to sales
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anticipated for the entire year, pius the difference between initial
inventories of finished product and the level of such inventories
desired for the end of the year, i.e. Po(z; 0) =So(z;0) + H0(z)
H (0). We assume that the optimum production plan involves pro-
ducing in the ith season a certain fixed proportionof the entire
program (the sum of the 7's is of course unity). Thus the amount
of production planned at the beginning of the year for the ith
period would be
(1) Po(i; i—i) [So(z; 0) + Ho(z) —H(0)]
If the seasons are all of equal length, and the optimum plan in-
volves distributing production evenly over the year, then yi =yj=
1/z. In general, however, there is no reason to believe that this
equality will hold, even if the seasons are of equal length. To begin
with, there may be technological factors that make it impossible
to run production at the same rate through the year; e.g. certain
types of productive facilities may have to be overhauled at regular
intervals. Further, climatic conditions might make it more eco-
nomical to concentrate production in certain seasons of the year,
as when one of the inputs is a perishable crop. Again, an abso-
lutely constant rate of production might force the firm to secure an
uneconomical amount of costly storage facilities. As a result of these
and other factors the most economical plan might involve different
rates of production for the different seasons, even if the firm knew
with certainty the total amount it would have to produce during
the year (as, for instance, if the total output had been sold for-
ward).21
In addition we must take into account the risk factor arising from
uncertainty. Uncertainty as to the total amount that will be sold
during the year will tend to be greatest at the beginning of the year
and to decrease as the year progresses and as the heavy season ap-
•proaches. This factor should induce the firm to postpone produc-
tion and should therefore operate in the direction of a plan in which
the rate of production in the early season is less than the average
over the year or, at any rate, less than what would be desirable in
a world of perfect certainty. But uncertainty is sure to work in this
direction oniy if the cost of production is approximately independent
of the rate of production, as is the case when marginal costs are
constant. With a nonlinear cost function, on the other hand, it can
21 See Herbert Solow, "Operations Research," Fortune, April 1951; also Philip
M. Morse and George E. Methods of Operations Research, 1st edn.,
rev. (Wiley & Sons, 1951).
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be shown that uncertainty may well push in the opposite direction.
We shall not enter into any further theoretical analysis of these
questions.22 The foregoing discussion is sufficient to establish that
there is no a priori reason to assume that all the y's will be equal.
Now, it follows from our hypothesis, and from equation 1, that
the share of the total program which, as of point zero, is planned
to be produced from the beginning of the ith season to the end of
the year will be given by
(2) Po(z; i—i) =[So(z;0) + Ho(z) —H(0)]
Further,the proportion of this share programmed for the ith season
itself will be
Po(i; i—i) yj[So(z; 0) + Ho(z) —H(0)]—
_____
— r ( Po(z;i—1) +Ho(z) —H(O)1 —
Letus now consider the situation that will exist at the beginning
of the ith season. The shipments expected by the firm at this time
for the balance of the year will be i—i), and the production
program for the balance of the year will be
(4) i—i) = i—1) —.1—. —H(i—1)
What will be the optimum way of distributing this production over
the remaining seasons, i to z? We shall make the assumption that




Pj_i(i; i—i) = i—i)
= i—1) + —H (i—i)]
whereis defined by equation 8. It should be noted that equation
5 cannot be derived from 8; it represents an independent assumption
which we feel to be reasonable, at least as a first
Equation 5 embodies the first of our basic assumptions as to the
short-run determinants of production plans.23
22Ananalysis of these and related problems, with special emphasis on the
effect of uncertainty, will be given in forthcoming publications of our project
and especially in the summary volume mentioned earlier.
23Forthis assumption to be tenable, it is necessary that the length of the
(technological) production period be small relative to the length of the "sea-
son." If this condition is not satisfied, equation 5 and much of the discussion
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Our next problem is that of determining the relation between
production plans made at the beginning of the given season and
actual production in the course of the season, i.e. in our notation,
the relation between P (i;i—i). This relation must
depend on two major factors: (1) the extent to which the expecta-
tions of the firm change in the course of the season itself, and (2)
the extent to which the firm finds it advantageous to adjust its pro-
duction in the course of the season so as to conform with its revised
expectations.
Suppose, first, that expectations are revised continuously and pro-
duction plans are adjusted instantaneously to conform with the
revised expectations. In this case actual production for the ith sea-
son would depend on the path traced by expectations from the be-
ginning to the end of this season. For the purpose of this discussion
expectations as of any point of time within the ith season can best
be thought of as representing the total amount the firm expects it
will have to produce from the beginning of the ith season to the
end of the year. At the beginning of the season, as we have already
seen, this amount is
(6) i—i) .—f- —H(i—1)
while by the end of the season it will be
(7) i) _4— S(i; i—i) 4- —FI(i—1)
Thus the time series describing the requirements anticipated at
successive points of time within the ith season begins at a level given
by 6 above and ends at a level given by 7. Suppose that between
these two points the path is approximately monotonic (i.e. con-
tinuously rising or continuously falling); then it may be shown that
actual production must fall somewhere between the quantity• that
would have resulted if anticipated requirements had been held tin-
changed throughout the season at the level given by 6 and the
quantity that would have resulted if they had been held unchanged
of the present and following two sections must be modified to take into account
the effect on production of goods in process at the beginning of the ith season.
Clearly, if the production period were as long as or longer than the season,
then the output within the season would be determined entirely by previous
"starts," assuming that it is not economical to discontinue production already
in process. No attempt will be made in this paper to develop systethatically the
required modifications, since for those industries for which empirical tests of
our model are presented the condition mentioned at the beginning of this foot-
note is likely to be approximately fulfilled. However, some indications of how
our model can be generalized are given in footnote 24.
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at the level given by 7. In other words, the level of production can
be described by the equation
(8)P(i;i—1) i—i) —i—
i)S(i; i—i) 4— —H(i—1)]
where the coefficient mj musthave a value between zero and one,
aslong as the path traced by expectations is monotonic. In the
special case in which the path of expectations is linear it can be
shown thatis a monotonic increasing function of r4 and that its
value will be close to one-half ifis small and will approach unity
as r• approaches unity (toward the end of the year).
In general there is, of course, no reason to suppose that the path
of expectations for a single firm, or even for an aggregate of firms,
should be linear within any given season. However, if our data are
time series of several years, then it is not unreasonable to assume
that the average path might be described approximately by a straight
line. Accordingly, the average value oftaken over a number of
years may be expected to increase for successive seasons of the year
from a lower value close to one-half to an upper value close to unity.
Equation 8 was derived under the assumption that the firm would
find it profitable to change its production plan continuously to con-
form with its revised expectations. If, on the other hand, production
plans are completely rigid within the season, then production will
continue at the level planned at the beginning of the season, that is:
(9)P(i; i—i) = i—i)
—H(i—1)]
It seems reasonable to assume that plans are neither perfectly
rigid nor perfectly adjusted. We might therefore expect production
to fall between the value of the right-hand side of equation 8 and
the value of the right-hand side of equation 9; that is, production
might be expressed as a weighted average of production under the
assumption of perfect adjustability and production under the as-
sumption of perfect rigidity, with weights a and (1—a) respectively.
The coefficient a will have a value between zero and one and will
be smaller the greater the rigidity of the plan:
(10) P(i;i—1) = —H(i—l)J
+ i) + S(i; i—i)+ —H(i—1)J
+ —H(i—l)]}
= i—i) +Hj_i(z)1
+ (z; i)+ (z)J + (i;i—i)
—
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The coefficient am measures the extent to which new information,
represented by the actual level of sales and revised expectations
during the season, influences production for that season. Borrowing
a concept from the field of servomechanisms we may label it the
"feed-in" coefficient. If plans and expectations are perfectly rigid
within the season so that no new information can be fed in, then a,
and therefore am, will be zero, and production will be equal to
the initial plan. If, on the other hand, production (and expectations)
can be adjusted immediately to conform with the latest available
information, then a will be unity and the coefficient am reduces to
the coefficient m, whose properties we have already discussed.24
In equation 10 the dependent variable is production. This equa-
tion, however, can be used to express the relation between end
inventories and the variables appearing on its right-hand side. This
24Wemay briefly indicate at this point how the results expressed by equation
10 might be generalized to include the case (mentioned in footnote 23)' where
the length of the production period is not small relative to the length of the
season (but is still shorter than one full season). Let 0 denote the production
period, i.e. the time required by the given technology of production, for an
item to run through the entire production process, and let i' =i—O.Let R(t)
denote the rate of "starts" at time t. We must then have
P(i; i—i)R(i'; i'—l)
In order to account for the quantity R( i'; i'—1) we may, in analogy to
equation 5, assume
i'; i'—1) = z; i'—l) 4- z)
[H(i'—l) + P(i—1; i'—1)J}
The quantity in braces represents total anticipated requirements, in terms of
starts, as of point i'—l (anticipated sales and desired end inventories less initial
stocks and production already in course); it corresponds to equation 6. Simi-
larly, equation 7 would be replaced by
St.(z; i') —F- S(i'; i'—l) —[H(i'—l)+ P(i—1; i'—l)]
Introducing assumptions analogous to those leading to equations 8 and 10 and
taking into account the identity
H(i'—l) + P(i—1; i'—l)H(i—1) + S(i—1; i'—l)
we end up with
( ba)P( i; i—i) =R(i'; i'—l ) = 1—a; in) Z; i'—l) + z)]
+ z; i') + 114' (2)] —4— r4.a;S ( i'; i'—l )
— — i'—l)
The right-hand side of this equation differs from that of 10 by the fact that
sales expectations and actual sales relate to points or intervals of time leading
the season by an amount 0, and by the presence of one extra term, the last.
In the limiting case where 0 =zeroso that i' =i,this last term becomes zero
and bOa coincides with 10. If direct information on "starts" were available, our
equations could easily be modified to take this addlitional information into
account; some difliculties would arise, however, ifthe firm were to vary
significantly the length of the production period. In lOa this possibility is
formally accounted for through the coefficient
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can be done by utilizing the fundamental identity relating sales,
production, and stocks of finished product, namely:
(11) H(i) _=H(i—l) + P(.i; i—i) —S(i—1)
Substituting 10 into 11 we derive




Equations 10 and 12 represent the basic hypothesis that underlies
the several statistical analyses which we have carried out.
8. GENERALIZATIONS OF THE MODEL AND IMPLICATIONS
Before we describe the tests and the results obtained, it will be
necessary to set out a few more considerations in connection with
our hypothesis.
1. Equations 10-12 were derived from a model which assumes that
the only function of inventories is to permit the firm to operate at a
fairly uniform rate even though its shipments are subject to seasonal
fluctuations. This assumption, incidentally, is of some importance in
justifying one feature of our model that might seem unrealistic,
namely, that the anticipations entering our equation are always for
the balance of the year and do not go beyond the year itself. The
rationale for this aspect of our model need not be discussed here
since it is developed in a joint paper by the senior author and Franz
E. Hohn in a forthcoming issue of Econometrica. It is shown there
that, under the stated assumption as to the role of inventories, for
seasonal industries the optimum production plan for one year is
generally independent of expectations for later years, especially if
there are substantial costs in storing the output. As a matter of fact
it is well known that plans of firms relating to current operations
are frequently set up for the fiscal, year and do not extend beyond,
except for the lead time needed to procure certain raw materials
and parts.
No doubt, to assume that the only function of inventories is to
smooth production operations is unduly restrictive. The need to
carry enough stock to assure continuity of operations must play a
role, at the very least for goods in process. Recognition of this func-
tion of inventories, however, does not seem to require any significant
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modification in the variables entering equation 10, though the co-
efficients of these variables might be somewhat altered.
2. The influence of cost and price expectations can be handled
easily by adding certain variables to equation 10. The same set of
considerations underlying this equation leads us to the conclusion
that the additional variables should be primarily cost expectations
both as of the beginning and as of the end of the season.
8. In equation 10 we have implicitly assumed that the production
plan made at point i depends exclusively on information at point i
itself, and is therefore independent of earlier events, and in par-
ticular of plans that were made for the ith season at the beginning
of the year or at some later intermediate points. Clearly this is
somewhat unrealistic, but we must forgo a thorough discussion of
this point in this paper. It will suffice to say that a more general
form of equation 10 might have to include variables with dates
earlier than point of time i, and these variables may be both antici-
pated and realized variables. This principle will find application in
some of the tests described below.
4. A problem closely related to the one just discussed is the in-
fluence of limitations of productive capacity on our hypothesis 10.
It is related to the previous subject because the level of capacity
in existence is obviously tied up with expectations held for the
given point of time at earlier points of time. It is clear that the
production plan, or actual production, cannot exceed existing Ca-
pacity. It follows that whenever the expression on the right-hand
side of equation 5, 8, or 10 takes a value greater than productive
capacity for the ith season, then the equation no longer holds, and
it should take a different form; in particular, equation 10 should
take the form
(18) P(i;i—1)Po(i; i........1)
Here P° (i; i—i) denotes the maximum amount that can be pro-
duced in the ith season with existing capacity. It is well to remember,
however, that in many cases the notion of capacity is not merely
a physical or engineering one, but rather an economic one. The
point is that, beyond a certain critical point, cost will tend to rise
rapidly even before an absolute ceiling is reached, if there be such
a ceiling. If we interpret PC to denote this critical level, and if we
denote the value of the right-hand side of equation 10 by P*, then
we might expect that wheneverexceeds P°, actual production
will be less than P° though it will tend to exceeditself. It is in
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fact not unreasonable to expect that actual production P will tend
to exceed P' by an amount that depends on the extent to which
exceeds In other words, we may expect an equation of the fol-
lowing type to hold:
p— pc=
fdenotessome monotonically increasing function.
Equations 10 and 14 can be subsumed under a single more gen-
eral form if we make use of the notion of a "switching. device" that
has been made familiar to economists by some recent writings.25
This more general equation states that P(i; i—i) will be equal to
the right-hand side of 10 or the right-hand side of 14 depending on
whether the right-hand side of 10 is smaller or larger than P'. These
conditions may be stated by means of the equation
(15)P(i;i—1) = P*(i; i—i) ++f(p*_pc)—
+(1_d)P*
Here the switching coefficient d is defined as having the property
d—flifP*(i;i_1)
<Pc(i; i—i)
5. We should like to make one more general comment as to the
significance of the empirical tests of the hypothesis that we are
about to present. Equation 10 (or its generalizations just con-
sidered) tells us that production in the ith season should depend on
two types of variables: certain conventional or expost variablessuch
as initial stocks, sales, and productive capacity; and variables meas-
uring anticipations of the firm. The latter is of course a type of
variable that has seldom, if ever, been used before in empirical
analysis, and a good deal of interest must center on whether we
can actually detect the influence of these "psychological" variables.
In particular, it should be noted that in our equation the symbol
denotes "operating expectations," or the expectations that really
underlie the plan of the firm.
There is no a priori way of telling whether the information on
expectations that has been gathered in the past through the types of
25 Such switching devices, for instance, play an important role in J. R. Hicks'
business cycle model, though they are not called by this name. See his A Con-
tribution to the Theory of the Cycle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950).
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surveys at our disposal really reflects operating expectations. One
may easily think of many reasons why it may not do so. For example:
the personal views of the respondent may not coincide with the ex-
pectations underlying the plan, which presumably must reflect some
kind of consensus of top executives; the respondent may be report-
ing his present momentary feelings, which do not coincide with
operating expectations, though he might have originally concurred
with these expectations; and he may not be well informed as to the
operating expectations of the firm.
In testing the influence of the expectation variables at our disposal
on production (or stocks), we have, therefore, a double interest:
to know whether these variables will be useful in forecasting and to
test whether there is any evidence that production responds to our
psychological variables. The latter question is important, first, be-
cause many economists have been inclined to discount heavily the
influence of such psychological variables; and second, because if
we can establish the relevance of these variables in controlling pro-
duction, this will serve also to confirm that our expectation variables
do measure operating expectations, at least to some extent.
There is a real difference between the question whether expecta-
tions are "relevant" in explaining the behavior of production and
the question whether they are useful for forecasting. This difference
can be seen from the considerations discussed below.
Our basis equation (10) involves two expectation variables, of
which one, initial expectations, leads the production variable
whose behavior we are trying' to explain, while the other, end ex-
pectations,lags it. Furthermore, we see that the relative influence
of these variables on production, as measured by their coefficients,
depends on the size of the feed-in coefficient If the feed-in
coefficient is close to zero, then initial expectations will play a
dominant role, and the influence of end expectations will be small;
while if the feed-in coefficient is close to unity, the very opposite
will be true. From the point of view of the significance of expecta-
tions the size of the feed-in coefficient is of little consequence. For
if our hypothesis is basically correct and our measures of expecta-
tion satisfactory, then, regardless of the size of the feed-in coefficient,
our statistical tests should show that at least one of the expectation
variables exerts a significant influence on production (or inven-
tories); and if this much can be established, it would be sufficient
to support the hypothesis that expectations are relevant.
On the other hand, the size of the feed-in coefficient is most im-
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portant from the forecasting point of view. If this coefficient is high,
then, at best, we might be able to exhibit the influence of end ex-
pectations; but this result would be of little help in forecasting, for
in order to exploit this fact it would be necessary to .forecast end
expectations themselves (as well as sales). For expectations to be
most useful in forecasting, initial expectations, which lead produc-
tion, should play the role; if this is to be so it is necessary
both that expectations be relevant and that the feed-in coefficient be
not too large.
One should not, however, jump to the conclusion that initial
expectations can be useful in forecasting only if the feed-in coeffi-
cient is small; in reality their usefulness will depend also on the
accuracy with which firms are able to forecast the future. This point
is best seen if we rewrite equation 10 in the form
(16) P(i; i—i) i—i) —1--
+ i) + S(i; i—i) +
—[Sj_i(z;i—i) + —
If we examine the expression inside the braces on the right-hand
side of the above equation, it will be seen that it represents es-
sentially the difference between required production from the be-
ginning of the ith season to the end of the year as anticipated at the
beginning of the ith season and that production as anticipated at the
end of the ith season. This means that if we forecast production using
initial expectations and stocks alone, we shall commit an error that
is equal to the difference in these expectations, times the feed-in
coefficient (and multiplied again by the optimum share of this pro-
gram assigned to the ith season). Now this difference clearly depends
on how well firms can forecast in the short run; if they are able
to forecast with great accuracy, then the difference will be zero, and
our forecast from stocks and initial expectations will be satisfactory
regardless of the size of the feed-in coefficient. Thus the usefulness
of initial expectations and stocks for forecasting production depends
really on the product of two factors, the size of the feed-in coefficient
and the ability of firms to forecast.26
The foregoing discussion leads to a second set of considerations.
Clearly, the size of both of the factors just mentioned will depend
on the length of the season i. The shorter the season, the smaller
26Itis not even strictly necessary that the forecasts be accurate. It is suf-
ficient that anticipated requirements as of the beginning of the season be highly
correlated with anticipated requirements as of the end of the season.
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the error of the firms' forecast will tend to be, and the same is
likely to hold for the feed-in coefficient, since it is true at least for
the factor m. On the other hand, the usefulness of the forecast will
decrease with the shortness of the season, and for very short seasons
a simple extrapolation of level may be just as satisfactory on the
average. So even if we find we can make good short-term forecasts
by using exclusively the lagged terms of equation 10, we should
make sure that such forecasts are better on the average than those
that might be made by some obvious naïve model.
The size of the feed-in coefficient am may also be expected to
vary from season to season. We have already seen that the factor m
should tend to grow as the end of the fiscal year approaches. A
similar tendency may also exist for the factor a. This factor, it wifi
be recalled, measures the extent to which plans are revised within
a season to conform with revised expectations. Now there will
typically be a sizable cushion of inventories in the early seasons and
plenty of opportunity to correct errors in later seasons. Both of these
factors should tend to reduce the pressure to adjust plans quickly.
However, toward the end of the year, failure to adjust plans may
result in actual ioss of sales, unless the "normal" level of inventories
planned for the end of the year is a large fraction of sales in the
last season.
We therefore have some reason to expect, on a priori grounds,
that the size of the feed-in coefficient, and hence the forecasting
value of initial expectations, should be greatest toward the beginning
of the fiscal year.
We may point out, finally, that if the feed-in coefficient is large
and expectations are relevant, then in order to make good forecasts
it becomes necessary to forecast, at the beginning of the period to
be forecast, the end expectations of the firm. This task involves, in
turn, a study of the factors controlling the formation and change
of economic expectations. While a good deal of work has been done
on this subject in the course of our project, we shall not be able to
touch on this here.
4. ADAPTATIONS OF THEMODELTO AVAILABLE DATA
In order to test equation 10 or any of its generalizations, we
should have information, for each season of the year, on production,
stocks, sales, initial anticipations for the balance of the year, and end
anticipations for the balance of the year. Information of this type
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is rather scanty, even if we are willing to define our season arbi-
trarily so as to fit available data. Accordingly, in every one of the
tests described below we have had to modify the model somewhat
to make it fit the type of information available. Most of these elabo-
rations of the model are best described in connection with each
specific test. However, there is one moçliflcation that is common
to all tests and we may therefore conveniently discuss it here.
None of our sources of expectations data supplies us with expec-
tations for the balance of the fiscal year. In every case they refer
rather to certain calendar periods which are, with few exceptions,
either calendar quarters or calendar half years. Suppose, for in-
stance, the information refers to quarters; then using our notation
and identifying the quarter with our season, we might at best know
the variables (i; i—i) and(i+1; i) instead of the variables
(z;i—i)and(z; i), which actually enter our equation 10. In
order to get over this difficulty we have to introduce an assumption
that seems to us a reasonable approximation—that, by and large,
firms usually expect their sales to exhibit the normal seasonal pat-
tern. Thus ifdenotes the normal seasonal coefficient for the ith
season, i.e. the proportion of the yearly.sales normally occurring in
the ith season, we assume that
(17) So(i;i—1)siSo(z;O)
where










Our problem, however, is to express i—i) in terms of
(i;i—i). To do so, we have to introduce the further assumption
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that the relation between (z;i—i) and (i;i—i) is the same
as the relation between So(z; i—i) and So(i; i—i), that is:
(19) (z; i—i) = (i;i— 1)
This equation in effect states that at any point of time sales antici-
pated for the remaining portion of the year bear the normal seasonal
relation to sales for the immediately following season.
By means of equation 19 we are now in a position to transform
the variables relating to expected sales on the right-hand side of
equation 10 to the form in which these variables are expressed in
the data available to us. This transformation is accomplished by
replacing Sj_i(z; i—i) and i) by i—i) and ui÷iSi
(i+1;i)respectively.
After this substitution, equation 10 wiii contain only one variable
about which we do not usually have any direct information, namely
(z),planned end inventories.
Since the end of the fiscal year, as defined by us, is followed by
a period of seasonally low sales, it follows that if the only function
of inventories were the smoothing of production operations, we
should expect the firm to plan to hold zero inventories at the year
end.27 If, however, we take into account the other function tra-
ditionally assigned to inventories, that of providing a reserve against
error in sales expectations, then it seems reasonable to assume that
planned end stocks should be roughly proportioned to sales ex-





27 On this point see section D 3, point I.
28 If the seasons were short (which is approximately equivalent to saying
that zislarge), then the assumption expressed as equation 20 might not be
entirely satisfactory for 'values of i close to z.Ifthe firm happened to be
seriously overstocked at this point of the year (in the sense defined by equation
24, our assumption might involve a violent contraction in production and, under
extreme conditions, even negative production, which is of course impossible.
This could be handled 'by specifying that under certain stated con-
ditionsz) would not be equal to the right-hand side of equation 20, but
would depend instead on sales expectations for the entire following fiscal year.
It does not, however, seem worth while to complicate our model in this fashion,
since in our statistical tests the seasons are defined as periods of three months,
and for periods of this length equation 20 may be expected to represent a
reasonable approximation.
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By means of equations 19 and. 20 we may now reduce equations
10 and 12, respectively, to the following forms, in which no variable
appears except those about which we usually have information:
(21a)P(i; i—i) = i—i)






These two equations represent the basic model tested in the time-
series test in section D 6 below.29
It will be noted that the coefficients of each of the independent
variables appearing in these equations are characterized by sub-
scripts identifying them with the particular season i, to which the
equation refers. In other words, these coefficients may generally be
expected to assume different values in the different seasons of the
year. Furthermore, our model enables us to draw some interesting
tentative conclusions as to the way in which these coefficients may
be expected to change as the year progresses.
First, concerning the role of initial stocks, it is seen that the Ca-
efficient of this variable in equation 21b is —Ti, and this parameter,
as can be verified from its definition, equation 3, will tend to in-
crease from a small fraction toward unity as we approach the end
of the fiscal year. Hence initial inventories should play a growing
role in explaining production decisions, while at the same time they
should play a decreasing roleS in explaining the behavior of end in-
ventories (see equation 21b).
Similarly, because of the behavior of Tj and because the feed-in
coefficient itself is likely to grow larger, the role of actual sales
29 Strictly speaking, equations 21a and 21b hold for values of i different from
z. When i takes the value z, end expectations cease to have any meaning. In
this case, taking into account the fact that== 1,these formulas should
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within the period will also grow in importance as the year pro-
gresses. On the other hand, from definition 18b we see that
mustnecessarily fall as we move toward the end of the year. It
follows that both expectation variables will tend to• decrease in
importance relative to actual and this tendency will be even
further accentuated iTi the case of initial anticipations if the feed-in
coefficient tends to increase.
The model we just developed also enables us to give an
operational definition of the notion of "normal" or "equilibrium"
stocks' at point i, He (i),which notion plays a role in the tests of
section D 5.
To begin with, it seems reasonable to say that stocks at the be-
ginning of the year are normal in relation to expectations held then,
if the firm is planning neither to add to these stoqks nor to decrease
them in the course of the year as a whole; hence normal stocks at
the beginning of the year, Ho(O), will be defined by the equation
=Ho(z)
Now if beginning stocks are normal according to this definition, i.e.
if H(O) = He(O) = Ho(z), then it may be shown that our model
implies that the of stocks planned for any other season, H0 (i),
will be given by




Thus if initial are normal, then stocks planned for the end
of the ith season will be proportional to sales anticipated for the
balance of the So(z; i), as well as to sales anticipated for the




Wewill now say that stocks at the end of the ith season are normal
if they bear the al4ove mentioned ratio to sales expected at that
SOmay be notedparticularthat in our model the coefficient of end expec-
tations may be as zero in the last season since these expectations do
not appear in the equation (see footnote 28).
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point of time. In other words, the normal level of stocks for the end
of the ith season will be defined thus:
(24) H6(i) = Sj(i—l--1;i)
s3
The quantity H(i) —H6(i)can then be regarded as a measure of
imbalance in inventories as of the end of the ith season. It can be
shown that, by means of these definitions, equation 5 can be trans-




It follows from our definition of the coefficientsandthatthe
quantities
Pj_1(i; i—i) Sj_i(i; i—i)
and
represent, respectively, planned production, and anticipated sales
for the ith season at seasonally adjusted annual rates.
The above equation can therefore be given the following simple
interpretation:if stocks are below (above) normal so that the
quantity H6 (i—i) —H(i—i)is positive (negative), then produc-
tion, seasonally adjusted, will be planned to exceed (fall short of)
seasonally adjusted expected sales for the season, the difference
having the purpose of correcting part of the existing imbalance in
inventories. The coefficient measures thefractionof
the initial imbalance in inventories that is scheduled for correction
within the ith season itself;it can be verified that this fraction
grows toward an upper limit of one, as the year progresses.
It is apparent from these results that our definitions of "normal"
stocks and of "imbalance" in stocks are fully consistent with the
common but mostly undefined use of these terms.
5. A TEST BASED ON A GROSS-SECTION OF FIRMS
Hypotheses 20a and 20b can be tested statistically by means of
cross-sectional data or by means of time-series data. In our cross-
sectional analysis we test whether differences observed at one point
of time in the rate of production (or in the level of stocks held) by
the different firms included in our sample can be accounted for by
corresponding differences in the level of the dependent ,variables.
In time-series tests we test whether variations over time in produc-
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tion (or in level of stocks) can be accounted for by corresponding
variations over time in the dependent variables. We have carried
out, and are still carrying out, a number of tests of both these types.
In this section we shall present the results of one cross-sectional test
based on the Dun & Bradstreet survey, and in the following two
sections some time-series tests will be discussed.
Most of the Dun & Bradstreet surveys do not readily lend them-
selves to cross-sectional tests of our hypothesis since they do not
supply information on end expectations or on final stocks for the
period covered. Furthermore, the information given is not in terms
of dollar or physical units, but in 'terms of percentage changes from
the value of the variable at the corresponding time of the year before.
In three of the Dun &Bradstreetsurveys, however, the question-
naire was somewhat different. This is exemplified by the August
1949 survey, in which the respondents were asked about (1) stocks
at the end of June, (2) stocks at the end of (3) expectations
at the end of August, and (4) sales in the month of August. All
questions, as usual, were in terms of percentage changes from the
year before. If we can assume that changes in sales from August
1.948 to August 1949 were roughly representative of changes in
sales from July and August 1948 to July and August 1949, then we
find that we have at our disposal all of the information, except that
on initial expectations, required to test equation 21b for a "season"
consisting of the months of July and August.
It can be shown that by appropriate algebraic transformations,
equation 21b implies a certain relationship between the variables
supplied by the Dun & Bradstreet survey. Neglecting some second-














H(A)=ratioof stocks at the end of August 1949 to stocks
at the end of August 1948
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SA. ( = ratioof sales expected in August 1949 for the
S' ( fourthquarter of 1949 to sales in the fourth quar-
ter of 1948
S (A)=ratioof. sales in. 1949 to sales in August
''1948
=ratioof stocks at the end of June 1949 to stocks at
/the end of June 1948
=ratioof stocks at the end of December 1948 tà
stocks expected for the end of December 1949
We shall not go into the derivation of this expression, since that
involves rather lengthy algebraic transformations; we shall limit
ourselves to a brief explanation of the common sense of the various
terms entering equation 25.
Referring back to equation 24, we see that for any firm if actual
stocks at the end of the ith period are in equilibrium, then they
should bear a certain ratio to sales expected at that time for the
next period. If we could assume that, for every firm responding to
the Dun & Brâdstreet survey of August 1949, stocks were in equilib-
rium in both August 1948 and August 1949, then
H(A) SA(Q4)
H'(A) —S'(Q4)
This accounts for the first term on the right-hand side of equation
25. However, this equality will not hold if stocks were out of equi-
librium in either August 1948 or August 1949. The remaining two
terms in equation 25 together provide for the effect of such dis-
equilibria.
The last term is a measure of the extent to which stocks were out
of equilibrium at the end of August 1948. Suppose that these stocks
were too high; then we should expect that stocks at the end of De-
cember 1948 would still be somewhat above equilibrium. Now we
assume that the level of stocks planned in August for the end of
December 1949 is approximately in line with the August anticipa-
tions of sales for the fourth quarter of 1949, SA (Q4),so that the
ratio HA(D)/SA(Q4) can be taken as a measure of the equilibrium
ratio of December stocks to fourth-quarter sales. Then if the ratio
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whichis the last variable in equation 25 is positive, this can be
taken as an indication that stocks at the end of December 1948 and
therefore at the end of August 1948 were excessive, and vice versa.
Furthermore, since excessive stocks in August 1948 should tend to
reduce the ratio H (A) /H' (A), we should expect that the coefli-
dent of this last term will be negative. Similarly, the remaining
term in equation 25 is a measure of the extent to which stocks at
the end of June 1949 were out of equilibrium. It is an essential
feature of our model that errors in stocks are corrected gradually
over the fiscal year; hence, other things being equal, excessive (de-
ficient) stocks in June 1949 should lead to excessive (deficient)
stocks in August 1949. It follows that the coefficient of this variable
should be positive.
It should be noted that in this test particular interest centers in
the first and third independent variables. Interest in the first
ble arises from the fact that this is a measure of expectations; the
third variable, on the other hand, is interesting because it involves
the use of planned levels of stocks as a measure of excess or short-
age of stocks.
We present here, the results secured for one selected industry,
namely, apparel. In the August 1949 survey this industry had the
largest number of respondents, totaling 75, and of these, 46 answered
all the questions that were necessary to carry out our test. Our
sample consists of these 46 respondents. Our least squares estima-
tion of the parameters of equation 25 yields the following results:
0.95X2 + 0.48X3 —0.21X4+ 0.01
(±0.10) (±0.08) (±0.05)
R=0.88
These results obvicusly are gratifying. The signs of the coefficients
are all as expecte4 and the least significant coefficient, that of X4,
is still over four times its standard error. The constant term differs
insignificantly from zero; and the coefficient çf the variable X2 is
close to the value of one, which we had anticipated on the basis of
our hypothesis. The multiple correlation coefficient is also uncom-
monly high for crOss-sectional data, and for a fairly large sample.
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Similar computations are in progress for samples of other industries
in this and other surveys, but the results are not yet ready to be
presented.
The test we have discussed so far, it will be noted, is primarily
a test of whether our. fundamental model, expressed by equations
10 and 25, is tenable and of whether expectations are "relevant." in
the sense defined earlier. It is not directly a test of the forecasting
value of expectations and plans, primarily because we do not have
in this survey a direct measure of initial anticipations. In the two
time-series tests that follow we shall focus more directly on the
question of the use of expectations for short-term forecasting.
6. TIME-SERIES TEST: PRODUCTION AND INVENTORY MOVEMENTS IN
MANUFACIVR[NG INDUSTRIES—A CASE STUDY OF THE
INDUSTRY
The shippers' survey supplies us with quarterly anticipations of
shipments expressed in volume terms (number of carloads). If we
define the seasons of the year as four three-month periods, we have
at our disposal information on beginning and end expectations and
actual shipments for some ninety periods between 1928 and 1950.
In order to exploit the shippers' survey for a test of our hypothe-
sis and for the estimation of the relevant parameters, we also need,
however, information on production and stocks on a monthly or,
at the very least, on a quarterly basis. Unfortunately, such informa-
tion is rather scanty. Moreover, the survey relates only to the frac-
tion of total shipments that travel by rail; this is a serious source
of difficulty and suggests the desirability of using industries for
which this method of transportation is predominant. It would also
be desirable to deal only with industries that manufacture a fairly
homogeneous product, so that carload shipments provide a reason-
ably good measure of sales.
We have been able to identify only one industry, the cement in-
dustry, that fulfills all of the above requirements reasonably well,
and two others, petroleum and lumber, that meet them rather im-
perfectly. In the case of the petroleum industry the major short-
coming is that the proportion of shipments normally transported
by rail is not large. In the case of the lumber industry the commod-
ity group "lumber and forest products" in the shippers' survey does
not coincide with the comparable industry for which statistics on
production and stocks are available. For these reasons our analysis
is most advanced for the cement industry.
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Another difficult problem arises in connection with the timing of
the shippers' survey. As we have indicated earlier, the respondents
are asked to forecast a given calendar quarter four to six weeks
before the beginning of the quarter. If we define the seasons as
calendar quarters, then we have a measure of expectations for each
season. But we have 'expectations held not at the beginning of this
season, but some six weeks before, and in dealing with three-month
periods a six-week difference is a very large one. On the other hand,
if we define each season as a three-month period, beginning at a
point of time as close as our data will permit to the time at which
the survey is conducted, then we shall have beginning and end ex-
pectations; however, these expectations will not refer to the season
as defined but to an bverlapping calendar quarter.
Thus the first definition implies the doubtful assumption that a
constant relationship exists between expectations held at a six-week
interval for the same future period, and the second definition im-
plies that there is a constant relationship between expectations held
at the same point of time for two successive and partly overlapping
periods. Since this latter assumption seems less objectionable than
the previous one, we have adopted the second definition for our
seasons. Because each survey is conducted around the middle of a
calendar month, while the figures at our disposal are for calendar
months, we must still decide whether the season should begin with
the month of the survey or with the following month. This decision
should be made so as to maximize the conformity of the beginning
of the seasons with the major planning dates in the industry under
consideration.
In the case of the industry we secured information on the
major planning dates and more generally on the entire planning
procedure by means of personal interviews with the management
of a few firms in the Chicago area. (We realize, of course, that the
Chicago area may not be representative of conditions in other parts
of the country.) We then defined the season as the three-month
period beginning two months before the calendar quarter cdvered
by the forecast. Thus the seasons are defined as consisting of the
three-month periods beginning, respectively, with the months of
November, February, May, and August. In this way the beginning
of the year for our model, November 1, coincides with what the
industry seems to consider the beginning of its shipment year.
The results we present in this paper are based on the above
definitions of the seasons. However, before we complete our analysis
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of this industry we shall test the effects of changing the definitions.
Some experiments in this direction are already in progress.
Only a few words are necessary concerning the sources of the
data. Information on stocks and shipments is taken from the cement
section of the Minerals Yearbook. Stocks represent the sum of
cement and clinker stocks. As for production, there is some question
as to whether one should use cement production, clinker produc-
tion, some average of the two, or some other measure. Since it is of
some importance in our case that the variables we use should sat-
isfy exactly the fundamental identity, we have defined production
as shipments pius increase in stocks.
There remains the problem that expectations are expressed in
carload units while stocks are reported in barrel units. Further, ex-
pectations refer only to that part of total shipments that goes by
rail. According to available information this propàrtion has been
at all times very high, usually between 80 and 85 per cent.
Now errors in the shippers' forecasts might arise from any of the
following three factors: (1) an error in estimating the total amount
of cement to be shipped, (2) an error in estimating the proportion
of this total to be moved by rail, and (3) an error in estimating
what we shall call the "conversion fact.or," i.e. the number of car-
loads necessary to move the number of barrels shipped by rail.
When, as in the case of the cement industry, the overwhelming pro-
portion of the output moves by rail, and the number of barrels per
carload changes very little, at least in the short run, then the most
important component of an error in a forecast must be the first of
the three factors, which is, the only one in which we are now inter-
ested. If we could assume that the error of the forecast is due ex-
clusively to this factor, then we could measure the error of antici-
pation for total shipments by the ratio of anticipated to actual
carloads. In this case anticipated total shipments in barrels could
be computed for any given quarter by multiplying the actual num-
ber of barrels shipped in that quarter by the ratio of anticipated
to actual carloads in that quarter.
Since, in fact, it is likely that the shippers are not able to antici-
pate fully the small observed changes over time in the conversion
factor, we used a slightly more complex procedure. An estimate of
anticipated total shipments in barrels was computed in two ways:
by the formula described above and by applying to anticipated car-
loads the conversion factor actually observed in the corresponding
quarter of the year before. (The reason for taking the correspond-
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ing quarter of the year before is that there is some evidence of a
slight seasonal pattern in the conversion factor.) The simple aver-
age of the two estimates was then used as the measure of antici-
pated total shipments; the series thus obtained differs from the one
obtained by the method first described only to the extent of elim-
inating certain minor apparent abnormalities.
It has already been shown in section D 2 that a basic feature of
our hypothesis is that the relation between production and the
variables presumably determining it may be expected to change
from one season to ahother.
For the presentatiqn of our empirical results it will be convenient
to define certain symbols. These symbols are defined in terms of
the first season of the year. The adaptation to the remaining sea-
sons will be obvious:
=productionin November and December of the calendar
year t— 1 and January of the year t
=stocksas of October 31 of the year t—1 (beginning stocks)
anticipations in November of the year t—1 for the first
calendar quarter of the year t (initial anticipations)
=shipmentsin the months of November and December of
year t—1 and January of the year t
=anticipationsin February of the year t for the second
calendar quarter of the year t (end anticipations)
All variables are measured in millions of barrels.
The coefficients of our equation have been estimated basically
by least squares. A special problem arises, however, when the equa-
tion involves a switching coeflicient, i.e. when d of equation 15
has the value one for some of the observations; in this case we must
estimate the function fofequation 15. This function fweshall
refer to as the "auxiliary equation." The difficulty is that in order
to determine fwemust first know the value for d for every ob-
servation, but this Elepends on F°, which can be evaluated only
after we know the observations for which d is equal to zero.
We have handled: the above problem by an iterative procedure.
First, we determined by inspection which years are not likely to
require the auxiliary equation. Equation 10 is fitted to these ob-
servations. From this first estimate we now compute andcheck
whether we were correct in our estimate of the years that should
be included. If we should find significant errors in our first guess
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we would then use our estimate of P° to decide which years should
be included. We then secure a second estimate of andso on.
In fact, however, we did not find it necessary to proceed to even
the second step in this iterative procedure.
For the first period it appears that an auxiliary equati6n is re-
quired for the years 1942 and 1947-1949 (the year 1946 is a border-
line case). The reasons justifying the use of the auxiliary equation
and the nature of this equation are best given at a later point. Ac-
cordingly, our hypothesis 10 was tested for the remaining eighteen
years—1928 to 1941 and 1943 to 1946.
Let us examine the zero-order correlation matrix obtained for
our five variables, X1 to X5, for the eighteen years just mentioned,
shown in table 11. The correlation between production and ship-
TABLE 11
Zero-Order Correlation Matrix, Cement Industry, Season I
Years Satisfying the Principal Equation (1928-1941 and 1943-1946)
. x6
X2 X3 (End
(Initial (Initial X4 Antici-
Stocks) Anticipation) pation)
X1(production) —0.71 0.969 0.938 0.86







Source: Based on data of Regional Shippers' Advisory Boards, Association of
American Railroads.
ments is rather high (0.938), though the size of our coefficients
must be heavily discounted since we are dealing with time-series
over a period characterized by wide fluctuations. However, the
correlation of production with initial anticipations is impressively
higher (0.969). In other words, initial anticipations are more im-
portant in forecasting production than perfect foreknowledge of
shipments.
The correlation of initial anticipations with actual shipments is
also very high (0.925), indicating that in this quarter expectations
tend to be fairly closely in line with actual later shipments; note,
however, that this cannot be taken as a direct measure of forecast-
ing accuracy because the period forecasted does not coincide with
the period covered by the shipments. The correlation between ini-
tial and end anticipations, on the other hand, is not so high, sug-
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gesting that sizable revisions in anticipations can occur within a
span of three months.
Finally, we might point to the remarkably low correlation be-
tween shipments and end anticipations (0.7). This low coefficient
is certainly inconsistent with the hypothesis that sales anticipations
are mere extrapolations of the most recent sales experience. How-
ever, this subject belongs to the study of the formation of expecta-
tions, which we cannot cover here.
It will be interesting to look next at the regression of production
on shipments and irutial stocks. This regression embodies in a sense•
the traditional approach, since it involves only conventional, expost
variables. It turns out that the partial correlation of production with
initial stocks, though negative as expected, is nonetheless of negligi-
ble magnitude (—0.15), and the multiple correlation amounts to
only 0.94. If we substitute initial anticipations for actual shipments
the partial correlation of stocks is somewhat higher and the multiple
correlation is a great deal higher, namely 0.971. In other words,
while in the previous case we explained 88 per cent of the variance,
by using anticipated instead of actual shipments we account for
94 per cent.
So far we know that we can make a fairly good forecast of pro-
duction on the basis of information on initial anticipations and
stocks. The question we may raise next is: To what extent could
we improve this forecast if we were able to forecast precisely forth-
coming shipments? This question may be answered by looking at
the partial correlation of production with shipments. It turns out
that information on actual shipments would reduce by only 14 per
cent the amount of variance not already accounted for by anticipa-
tions and stocks. But one might raise the question the other way
around. Suppose one had a good forecast of forthcoming ship-
ments. as well as information on initial stocks. How much would one
gain in terms of forecasting ability by knowing initial anticipations?
The partial correlation of production with anticipations turns out
to be 0.77, which means that such information would reduce by
approximately 60 per cent the variance not accounted for by actual
shipments and stocks. Thus information on initial anticipations turns
out to be significantly more useful in forecasting production than
in forecasting shipments. Indeed, information on actual shipments
does not significantly improve our ability to forecast.
Having highlighted these interesting conclusions, we can proceed
to a complete test of our hypothesis by introducing end expecta-
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tions as a fourth independent variable. The final regression equa-
tion, with standard errors of regression coefficients, is as follows:'
(26) =—0.50X2+ 0.52X3 + 0.43X4 + 0.32X5 +9.0
(±0.09) (±0.13) (±0.11) (±0.04)
R=0.996
These results are again obviously satisfactory. The significance
of every one of the regression coefficients exceeds considerably the
1 per cent level, and the multiple correlation is uncommonly high
even for time-series analysis. Our variables account for over 99 per
cent of the variance in production: We might note in particular that
the end anticipations turn out to have the highest partial correla-
tions (0.92).
It would be interesting at this point to carry out a detailed analy-
sis of the regression coefficients to see how well they agree with
what we might expect on the basis of our model. But space pre-
vents us from making such an analysis, which would be rather time-
consuming here, especially in view of the modifications of the model
necessitated by. the form and limitations of the data used. If the
reader carries out this analysis, he will find that the coefficients for
initial stocks and shipments are somewhat higher than our hypothe-
sis would imply. This suggests that production in the first season is
perhaps not exclusively keyed to the entire shipment year, and is
more influenced by current developments than our model assumes.
One word now about the switching device and auxiliary equation
for the first season. In the first season of the year, and especially
in December and January, it is normal for the cement industry to
cut its production considerably for various reasons. We find that in
every one of the years in which•(i.e. the value of X1 computed
from equation 26) exceeds significantly 90 per cent of production
in the previous season, production itself falls considerably short of
and is approximately equal to 90 per cent of' the previous sea-
son's production plus 30 per cent of the excess of over that
amount. Hence our switching coefficient for thi.s period is defined
as taking the value one, if, and only if, X1° exceeds 90 per cent of
the previous season's production. Our auxiliary equation takes the
form
(27) X1 =0.9X1(IV)+ —0.9X1(IV)}
where X1(IV) denotes actual production in the previous season.
The coefficient 0.3 was estimated by inspection. The auxiliary equa-
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tion fits the data fairly well, though not too much signfficance can
be attached to this in view of the very small number of degrees
of freedom. Our production equation for season I finally takes the
form
(28) = d1{0.9X1(IV) + —0.9X1(IV)])
where X° =—0.50X2+ O.52X3 +0.43X4 + 0.32X5 + 9.0
d1= lwhenX* ￿0.9X1(IV)
=0otherwise
The proportion of the original variance accounted for by equation
28 is 99 per cent, which is equivalent to a multiple correlation of
0.995. This figure is not, however, a multiple correlation coefficient,
for our equation was not entirely estimated by least squares. (See
also chart 5.)
We proceed now. to a quick review of the results for season II.
For this season limitation of capacity requires the use of a switch-
ing device for the years 1947, 1948, and 1949. For the remaining
nineteen years we find that. the simple correlation of production
with anticipationsnow much lower, namely 0.90, and is now
lower than the correlation with shipments, 0.93. As expected, initial
stocks play a more prominent role in this season. The multiple cor-
relation of production with shipments and stocks is 0.966 and is
equal to the multiple correlation of production with initial expecta-
tions and stocks. Thus, also in this season, perfect foreknowledge
of shipments woul4 not by itself enable us to forecast any better
than we could from beginning anticipation and stocks. However,
the addition of actual shipments to initial anticipation and stocks
reduces by 56 per cent the unexplained variance. In other words,
ability to forecast shipments perfectly in this season would help
somewhat to improve our forecast of production. At the same time,
initial anticipations also explain 56 per cent of the variance not ac-
counted for by and stocks; thus knowledge of initial
anticipations would once more help significantly to improve our
forecast, even if we were able to make a perfect forecast of ship.
ments.
The multiple correlation when all three variables are used simul-
taneously is 0.986. However, end anticipations do not have a signifi.
cant influence after the other variables have been taken into ac-
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different from zero. bur regression equation, dropping end antici-
pations, is
(29) X1 =—0.30X2+ 0.51X3 + 0.59X4 + 22.8 R=0.985
(0.22)(0.11)(0.13)
Comingnow to the auxiliary equation, it appears that in this
season the critical upper level of utilization is in the order of 60
per cent of theoretical capacity. For every one of the four years in
which i.e. the estimated value of X1 computed from equation
29, exceeds 60 per cent of capacity, we find that actual production
fell significantly short of this drop oôcurs in 1947, 1948, and
1949, and to a minor extent in 1942. Our switching device therefore
goes into effect wheneverexceeds 60 per cent of capacity. Our
auxiliary equation estimated by inspection is:
(30) =0.6+ 0.8 —0.6 P0)
where P° denotes the output capacity as estimated by the Bureau
of Mines. Our final equation for the second season, therefore, can
be written as
(31) = + d2[0.6P0 + —0.6P0)]
•whered2 =1when> 0.6P0
=0otherwise
The proportion of total variance of production accounted for by
the right-hand side of equation 30 is 98 per cent.
For the last two seasons our analysis is not yet sufficiently ad-
vanced to presentation at this 'time, Preliminary results
suggest that expectations, especially end expectations, play a less
important role. This is, of course, not inconsistent with our hypothe-
sis, as we have shown in section D 4, especially when account is
taken of the actual periods to which these expectations overtly
refer. In conclusion, the results of the tests carried out so far for
the cement industry a.ppear to be consistent with our model and to
support the hypothesis that expectations are both relevant and use-
ful in forecasting, although these results cannot be considered as
definitive.
7.TIME-SERIESTEST: INVENTORY FLUCnJATIONS IN THE
POSTWAR PERIOD
The major purpose of the last test we shall report here is to de-
termine whether anticipations as measured by the Fortune and the
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Dun & Bradstreet surveys can help us to account for the observed
fluctuations in stocks in the postwar period. Once more we are
interested in testing whether anticipations, as measured by these
surveys, are meaningful and whether the information reported
might be exploited for short-term forecasting. Such tests are planned
for all the major industries in which inventories play a significant
role and for which the relevant information is available. We shall
present here some preliminary results of tests carried out for all
nondurable goods manufacturing industries.
Our basic expectations data are derived from the Fortune survey,
which supplies us with information for eight points of time between
the end of 1946 and the middle of 1950. These expectations, it will
be remembered, refer to calendar half years, beginning about six
weeks after the survey is taken. Now we have reason to believe
that expectations may undergo substantial changes in the interval
of seven and one-half months between the survey and the end of
the period to which the expectations refer; some evidence support-
ing this has been brought out in previous sections. For this reason,
and because our interest here is in testing the use and relevance of
expectations for short-term forecasting, we shall assume that the
expectations reported may be used as a measure of short-term ex-
pectations for the three-month period beginning with the calendar
month immediately following the survey. Our problem is to explain
the level of inventories at the end of this period.
The reason for choosing end inventories, rather than production,
as our dependent variable is that we have directly available monthly
estimates prepared by the Department of Commerce of aggregate
dollar inventories and sales of this industry, whereas there is lao
corresponding information on production.
As long as we use Fortune as our only source for expectations
we have only eight observations to rely upon, an exceedingly small
number, especially when we are attempting to test a hypothesis
involving three independent variables. It will be recalled that in
section C we presented some evidence and arguments in support
of a hypothesis that the unadjusted response to the Dun & Brad-
street survey can be taken as a measure of short-term anticipations
roughly comparable to the Fortune responses. On the basis of this
hypothesis it appeared worth while to enlarge our sample by ex-
ploiting the returns of the Dun & Bradstreet surveys taken at points
of time differing by at least two months from the nearest Fortune
surveys. There are three such surveys, those of September 1949,
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February 1949, and July 1950. These increase our sample from
eight to eleven, a most welcome addition. For these three surveys
the period of analysis consists again of the three-month period be-
ginning with the first month following the survey.
Before proceeding to the test we must still face several serious
difficulties raised by the nature of the data. One important feature
of our basic hypothesis is that the relation between end inventories
(or production) and the relevant independent variables changes
from one season to another. This is why in the cement industry test
we treated each quarter of the year. separately. In the present case,
however, the series is so short that we have no choice but simul-
taneously to base our statistical test on the observations for all sea-
sons. This procedure can be justified only if the coefficients of the
equation to be tested can be assumed to be approximately constant
from season to season. Strictly speaking, this assumption is not
justified; there is reason to believe, however, that the error involved
in this assumption can be minimized by the use of seasonally ad-
justed data, which are also available in this case.
It can be shown that our basic equation 21b implies a linear
relation between seasonally adjusted inventories, expectations, and
sales of the form
(82)fl(i)AL_i(i; i—i) + BS(i; i—i) +
+E[Si(i+1;i)
The barred symbols in this equation represent seasonally adjusted
Seasonally adjusted sales and expectations at annual
rates are defined as in section D 4. Hence, for the model now being
tested we have31
• —. . S(i;i—1)
Seasonally adjusted sales; S(i; i—i). =
Seasonally adjusted initial expectations; i—i) =S (i;i— 1)
• . — •Sj(i-4-.1;i)
Seasonally adjusted end expectations; Si(t+1; t)=
Asfor seasonally adjusted stocks, they are defined as follows:
31Thefigure4appears as a divisor in these definitions since quarterly data
are being used.
344EXPECTATIONS AND PLANS OF FIRMS
where K, is defined by equation 22 and represents the "normal"
ratio of stocks at the end of season /toexpectations for the balance
of the year at seasonally adjusted annual rates, while cisthe av-
erage value of K, i.e.
It can be shown to follow from our model that c=4c"represents
the normal ratio of seasonally adjusted stocks to seasonally adjust-
ed quarterly sales, which ratio turns out to be a constant inde-
pendent of the season. The coefficients A, B, D, and E of equation
32 can be further expressed in terms of the various parameters de-







Of the various symbols appearing on the right-hand side of these
equations c andhave just been defined; o.j, andhave been
defined in sections D 2 and D 4 (see equations 13, 18b, and 20);
andstands for the following expression:
It can be shown that the quantity (1—b1) represents the fraction
of the imbalance in initial inventories (in seasonally adjusted terms)
that is scheduled for correction in the ith season.
For a complete test of equation 32 we should have information
on end period expectations, S.t(i+1; i). Unfortunately this informa-
lion is not available in the present case since the Fortune surveys
are at six-month intervals and we have found it desirable to define
our seasons as three-month periods. In order to salvage our test we
have to fall back on the assumption that the missing information
on end expectations can be approximated in terms of actual sales
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withinthe period, i.e. that i)S(i; i—i), so that the last
term of equation 32 drops out. This assumptiqn, of course, will
imply an error, but we may hope that this error is not too large and
can be included in the unexplained variance without seriously af-
fecting the estimates of the remaining coefficients.
Even with the heroic decision above, our difficulties are not en-
tirely over. It will be seen that every one of the coefficients A, B,
and D that still appear in equation 32 unfortunately cannot be ex-
pected to be constaflt from season to season because they involve
seasonally dated quantities like andIf we take into ac-
count that even the feed-in éoefficient am may vary from season
to season, then c appears to be the only coefficient that may be
expected to be seasonally constant. Thus even if the available data
were seasonally adjusted in accordance with our definitions (which
is of course very doubtful), it would still be desirable to treat each
season of the year separately in testing our hypothesis. This is a
very uncomfortable conclusion, since the shortness of the series
precludes our treating each quarter separately. It must be noted,
however, that our conclusion about the seasonal nature of the co-
efficients applies directly only to a single industry. In the present
test we are dealing with a large aggregate of industries whose sea-
sonals are not coincident and therefore partly cancel out. For any
individual industry the average value of any seasonal coefficient
over all seasons of the year is obviously a constant. By the same
token, if the various industries we are aggregating are in different
phases of their seasonal pattern at any given point of the calendar
year, then it may be hoped that a cross-sectional average of their
seasonal coefficients will possess a certain stability. It is with this
hope that we proceed to a test of hypothesis 32 (with the omission
of the last term), by means of the data described earlier.
The information on seasonally adjusted stocks and sales required
for this test was taken directly from the published series of the
Department of Commerce.32 For expectations we use the survey
data without further adjustment, since these expectations are sup-
posed already to be expressed in seasonally adjusted terms.
For the purpose Of carrying out the test one further transformation
was introduced in equation 32. The terms H(i) and measuring
as they do inventories adjusted for seasonal variation at only three-
32Forthe years 1946 through 1949, of Current Business (Department
of Commerce), October 1950, pp. 20-21; for 1950, current issues of the same
publication.
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month intervals, are bound to be highly intercorrelated to the point
where they would tend to yield a misleadingly high multiple cor-
relation and affect the reliability of our estimates of the other co-
efficients. We prefer, therefore, to transform our dependent variable
from the actual level of inventories to the rate of change of in-
ventories, which can easily be done by dividing both sides of the
equation by initial inventories. This has the added important ad-
vantage of reducing by one the number of variables and thus giv-
ing us one more degree of freedom. The resulting equation 34 was
then used in our test:
(34) H(0)_aH(0)+bH(0) +c'
where 1 and 0 denote respectively the end and beginning of each
period. The three variables will be denoted respectively by X1,
X2,and X3.
The zero-order correlation matrix for these. three variables is given
in table 12.
TABLE12
Zero-Order Correlation Matrix, Fortune and




Source: Based on data of Fortune magazine and Dun & Bradstreet.
The two striking features of this zero-order table are:
1. Initial anticipations account by themselves for a large propor-
tion of the variance in the rate of change of stocks, about 76 per
cent. This is true even though anticipations are only moderately
well correlated with actual shipments. (The correlation of 0.74 be-
tween these variables cannot be taken, however, as a direct meas-
ure of accuracy of anticipations in the sense of section C because
both anticipations and sales are here divided by the same variable,
H{0].)
2. The correlation with anticipations is impressively larger than
that with actual shipments; the latter variable accounts for only
59 per cent of the variance of the rate of change of stocks as against
74 per cent for anticipations. When we use both anticipations and
actual sales as independent variables the partial correlation of an-
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ticipations still remains fairly large, 0.70 (which is significant at
the 2 per cent level by standard tests). In other words, even if we
have a perfect forecast of sales, knowledge of anticipations accounts
in the period of observation for 50 per cent of the residual variance.
On the other hand, the partial correlation of actual shipments falls
to a rather insignificant level, 0.39 (which is not significant at the
5 per cent level). Thus if we have knowledge of anticipations, even
a perfect foreknowledge of sales does not signfficantly improve our
ability to forecast investment. (or disinvestment) in inventories. The
regression equation takes the form
(35) =0.19X2+ 0.06X3 + 0.58
(±0.06) (±0.05)
but our estimate of these coefficients, especially the second, is un-
fortunately subject to large error.
It is of some interest to utilize these estimates to obtain in turn
estimates of the parameters appearing on the right-hand side of
equation 33, which have a more direct meaning in terms of the
decision process. This can be done by solving equation 33 for these
parameters, in terms of our estimates of the coefficients A, B, and D.
To the extent that these parameters are seasonally dated, the esti-
mates obtained in this way are to be regarded as estimates of their
average value, the average being taken both over a cross-section of
industries and over the seasons of the year.
Since there are six distinct parameters on the right-hand side of the
relevant equation 3S and only three equations, we cannot estimate
each parameter separately. Two of these parameters, however, can
be obtained independently of the remaining one, namely:
b=D=0.53
A+B0.25 c=
The second of these parameters, it will be recalled, measures the
normal or desired ratio of stock to sales; our results suggest that
the normal level of stocks for the nondurable goods industries is
slightly over one-half of one period of sales or one and one-half
months of sales (since our period consists of three months). This
estimate appears extremely reasonable, as an inspection of the data
on sales and will easily reveal.
As for b, it will be recalled that this coefficient, or more pre-
cisely the quantity (1—b), is a measure of the speed with which
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inventories imbalance tends to be corrected. Our numerical esti-
mate indicates that, on the average, the industries under considera-
tion plan to correct in a three-month period approximately one-
half of any imbalance in inventories in existence at the beginning
of the period. This estimate, too, appears reasonable, since it can
be shown that a priori considerations suggest that this coefficient
should be precisely in the order of
It would, finally, be interesting to obtain an estimate of the feed-




In order to estimate am, therefore, we need to know the value of
s/K, which in turn should represent some average of the values of
overindustries and over seasons.
While we have no direct information about it, it can be shown
to follow from the definitions of c, s, and K that the value of the quan-
tity c (s/K)should be unity if the seasonals of the different industries
offset each other and that it is unlikely to depart very much from
unity unless the seasonal in production and sales is sharp. If we
take a value of around unity as a rough guess, then our feed-in
Aswe have argued, the value of b derived from the regression equation
should not be very different from the average value ofover all seasons of
the year. If we look at the definition of bc we see that this coefficient represents
the product of two factors; the second of these factors, represents
essentially the ratio of normal stocks at the beginning to normal stocks at the
end of each season and, therefore, should not be very different from unity if
the seasons are not too long. Next consider the first factor
If all the my's were equal (i.e. if production were planned at an even rate through
the year) then i—re =z—(i)/z---(i-—1).Hence if we are dealing with four
seasons per year so that i takes values from 1 to 4, the average value of 1—Ti
will be(¾ + %+ 0) =0.480.5. If the increase in the course
of the year, as is likely to be the case, the average will be higher; but unless
the seasonal is pronounced it is not likely to exceed an upper limit of, say, 0.6.
Hence the product of the averages of the two factors should be in the order of
0.5 to 0.6. Finally, we may observe that since inventories will typically rise in
the early part of the year and fall thereafter, the second factor will tend to be
above average when the first is below average; this negative correlation will
tend to depress somewhat the average product. On the whole, then, we are led
to expect an average value of b4 of about 0.5.
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coefficient would appear to be in the order of 0.8. This is a high
figure for a three-month period, but note that we have been getting
very similar estimates for the cement industry. It is this high value
of the feed-in coefficient that accounts for the fact that the coeffi-
cient of sales is positive, in equation 35.Atfirst this result might
appear disturbing, because, according to our hypothesis, the co-
efficient of sales in the stock equation should be negative. This is
true, however, oniy if end expectations are included explicitly in
the equation. In the present case actual sales are also a "proxy"
for end anticipations, and therefore have a double influence on
stocks. On the one hand, they are a drain on stocks, and to this
extent the coefficient of this variable should be negative; on the
other hand, insofar as this variable provides proxies for end ex-
pectations, its effect on stocks will be positive, since it will tend to
bring about a revision in the production plan in the same direction.
The strength of this positive effect depends, of course, on the feed-
in coefficient. In the present case the feed-in coefficient seems to be
large enough to cause the effect to outweigh the negative
one, though by a very slight margin. That is. to say, it would appear
that firms manage to revise production sufficiently to take care of
unanticipated changes in sales, but not sufficiently to change end
inventories significantly from the• level originally planned.
In conclusion, therefore, this last test again suggests that informa-
tion on anticipations supplied by the postwar surveys is both rele-
vant and useful in forecasting inventory movements; in fact short-
run movements in this variable appear to be forecastable to a con-
siderable extent by means of this information alone (plus initial
stocks). This is, indeed, an encouraging conclusion even if it is but
a tentative one, since the forecasting of short-run inventory move-
ments is usually considered one of the most difficult tasks in short-
term forecasting.
It has been the, purpose of this paper to test whether surveys of
business expectations are likely to be useful in forecasting. Our re-
sults, so far, are encouraging even though they are based on data
that are not the kind we ourselves would have collected for the
purpose. We can oniy hope that further and more extensive tests












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.EXPECTATIONS AND PLANS OF FIRMS
COMMENT
W. W. COOPER AND H. A. SIMON,
Carnegie Institute of
This paper by Modigliani and Sauerlender is long, interesting,
and incomplete. Full, and balanced assessment of an empirical study
like this must await revelation of much of the background material,
which is promised for studies to be released by the Bureau of Busi-
ness Research at the University of Illinois. These comments will,
therefore, be fragmentary and selective and directed toward some
of the more novel and interesting findings and ideas contained in
the paper.
The analyses of existing expectations data undertaken in this
study are valuable for the light they throw on business behavior.
Among other matters of interest, to which attention has already
been addressed at this Conference,1 is the question of how fore-
casts by professional economists compare with those by business-
men. Much more needs to be done before this question can be
discussed unequivocally. For example, the need for forecasting ac-
curacy of the professional group and that of the business group
should be compared both in terms of the problems to be solved by
such forecasts and the (e.g. administrative) mechanisms available
to each of the groups for corrective action in the event of mistaken
forecasts. Intimately involved in this question are the differences,
as well as relations, between forecasting for scientific and forecasting
for "practical" purposes. The two are not in all respects comparable;
and differences as well as similarities should be recognized in arriv-
ing at an assessment. The farmer, with smokepots available in his
orchard, needs to ni!leet, for his limited purposes, less exacting re-
quirements in his forecasts of the weather than does the meteorolo-
gist in his general-purpose analyses of the weather. The farmer's
tolerances are wider and vaguer, requiring him merely to turn the
smokepots up or dOwn, more or less, and except at certain critical
levels his forecasts do not even have to assume specific numerical
form. He can correct, overcorrect, and adjust from moment to
moment as he finds conditions altering, and his forecast band is,
generally, much shorter than that of the meteorologist. The need
for making the forecast and access to corrective instruments will of
1Seethe paper by V Lewis Bassie, "Recent Developments in Short-Temi
Forecasting," in this volume.
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course condition, if not determine, the character and the form of
the forecast.
Another matter of some interest revealed by Modigliani and Sauer-
lender's analyses of expectations data is the critical character of the
form of the questions by which the expectations are solicited. Much
depends on what the respondent is expected to estimate: experiences
of his immediate environment or the vast reaches of gross national
product. Much also depends on the bases of comparison to which
attention is directed, and the estimating form used. Ratio and ab-
solute estimates seem, ceteris paribus, to yield quite different re-
sults, as Modigliani and Sauerlender note. The clearest case, perhaps,
is the forecasts of the regional Shippers' Advisory Boards of the
American Association of Railroads. Here the method of estimating
is itself subject to the ordinary bias of a ratio estimate.2 But more,
apparently, is involved than this. Judging from Modigliani and
Sauerlender's analyses of Dun & Bradstreet and Fortune data on
expectations, a psychological, as well as a statistical, bias arises
when the questionnaire solicits information in ratio form. Evidently
the "stability" of ratios has psychological as well as statistical roots.
But, of course, it may be a mistake to accept such estimates of
anticipations by businessmen—or others—at face value. 'Practical"
people frequently behave more intelligently than they speak or
write.8 Closely related to this point is a question of different types
2Itis also subject to the bias of a "selected" sample intended tO give repre-
sentation to the large shippers. Even in unbiased sampling, however, a ratio
estimate will yield biased results. Thus, if X' =parameterfor which an estimate
is sought,. such as shipments in forthcoming quarter; Y' =baseto which ratio
is to be applied, such as actual shipments in comparable quarter of preceding




where the expected value EX —X'and the expected value EY =1".But the
ratio is secured in the form
XEX X'pyXOy
YEY EY
the amount of bias being given by the last term on the right. Thus in upturns,
where one would expect positive correlation, such a method would tend to
underestimate true levels, while in downturns, where one would expect negative
correlations, such a method would tend to overestimate true levels.
3AsModigliani and Sauerlender are careful to note. Estimates that seem to
be grossly unsatisfactory to an outsider may prove to be quite satisfactory for
practical operating purposes, and their use more satisfactory than allotting the
additional time and expense necessary to secure more precise and reliable
estimates.
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of budgets used by business firms for different purposes. Needless
to say, the types (and purposes) of budgeting used by business are
legion. But one distinction that should be drawn by persons analyz-
ing such data is between the use of budgets as forecasting or esti-
mating devices—in a. sense akin to scientific forecasting—and the
use of budgets as instruments of control and coordination. As Hart
has reminded us, uncertainty introduces elements into the picture
that cannot be resolved by reference to certainty equivalents of
uncertainty. One of these elements is the need, in planning, to plan
for replanning as events materialize.
Illustrative, of this difference in types are the so-called "variable"
(or flexible) and "forecast" (or fixed) budgets. Firms using modern
budgetary techniques usually choose the former type for their op-
erating budgets, and the latter for their capital budgets. The two
are quite different in emphasis, and hence the figures contained in
them need to be interpreted differently. A variable budget is a
frank recognition of the low probability to be attached to point, as
against interval, estimates. It begins by attempting to secure a
estimate of, say, sales, cost of sales, etc., but then immediately
begins to prepare for deviations from these values. It may be rough-
ly characterized in the following fashion: "If sales are at 100 per
cent of the assumed levels then costs should be of such and such a
magnitude, but if sales are only 90 per cent of the assumed levels
then costs should be of such and such different magnitude," and
so on. The emphasis of the flexible, as compared with the forecast,
type of budget is thus on control and coordination. If asked to re-
port a single figure of expected or budgeted sales, costs, etc., busi-
ness firms using type of budget for operating purposes and
those using a fixed or forecast type of budget are likely to attach
quite different meanings to this figure.
As has already been noted, the forecast type of budget is gen-
erally used for capital expenditures, and, indeed, it is difficult to
see how a flexible budget, strictly interpreted, can be used for
these purposes. Thus data on capital expenditures, such as those
being exploited by Friend and Bronfenbrenner, are likely to be more
homogeneous, at least in this respect, than budgetary data covering
operating costs. Of course, this is not to say that budgetary data on
capital expenditures can be taken at face value. in the case
of forecast budgets various trigger criteria at critical stages of exe-
cution—such as review by a budgetary committee before work orders
are issued—are frequently carefully built into the budget or sur-
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rounding budgetary procedures. As Katona has noted, much more
in the way of interviewing work, of the kind that Friend and Bron-
fenbrenner have now begun, is needed before safe ground can be
reached in prediction analyses resting on these types of data. Cer-
tainly, no mere questionnaire classification into types of budget
from which the data are extracted will prove sufficient, since even
so-called forecast, or fixed operating, budgets may have strong co-
ordinating and control (corrective or adjustive), as well as fore-
casting, procedures built into them.
Of some interest in this connection is the use of servomechanism
analogies by Modigliani and Sauerlender. These analogies have had
a strong appeal to us in work being done at the Carnegie Institute
of Technology in connection with a project on intra-firm behavior
sponsored by the Air Force. One reason for this appeal is the strong
intermixture of control and prediction (or lack of prediction) con-
siderations in the design of such devices.
Here a page may be borrowed from the electrical engineer in
his design, say, of a radio. He knows that an undesirable quality in
reception is noise or static. He knows that from time to time static
will be received, but he does not know when this will occur, or the
form it will take. But knowing (or predicting) that it will occur
within certain limits, he can build control devices into the mecha-
nism so that these undesirable properties will, within reasonable
limits of time and magnitude, be eliminated from the reception.
The basic control process built into such devices is not prediction
in the usual sense of that term. It is, rather, a process
ofprediction involved are:(1) assess-
ment and statement of goals, (2) recognition that disturbances will
occur in the process of attaining these goals, and (3) design (pre-
diction of the properties) of a control system or apparatus that will
correct for these disturbances when they occur.
Information is gathered at frequent intervals to determine de-
partures of actual behavior from some norm. The difference be-
tween the actual and the norm is regarded as an "error," and cor-
rections are made in order to reduce this "error." Diagram 1
illustrates what is involved. A common example of such a servo-
mechanism is the house thermostat, which does not try to predict
the weather, but simply measures deviations of actual from desired
room temperature and makes appropriate corrections.
No implication that engineering analogies can or should be im-
ported literally into economics is intended. But the central notion
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of the servomechanism—that behavior in the face of uncertainty
can take the form primarily of adjustment rather than prediction—is
certainly suggestive for many areas of business behavior.
As a matter of fact there is no reason why adjustment and pre-
diction cannot be combined, why the servomechanism cannot en-
compass both "feed-back" (or adjustive) and "feed-forward" (or
predictive) control. Indeed, Modigliani and Sauerlender have im-
plicitly recognized this by introducing a feed-forward device in
their model of production and inventory behavior. For their model
DiagramI
Comparison
Norm Unput) "Error" Control Actual (output)
center
Feed—back loop
maybe pictured as follows: At the present time, ,t,anestimate is
formed of how conditions will appear r units hence. On the basis
of this expectation, and by means of comparison with current out-
puts, corrective information is carried back to be translated into a
change in production or input schedules. A simple pictorial repre-
sentation of a contrOl system embodying both feed-back and feed-
forward is given in diagram
Our investigations: have indicated that the introduction of a pre-
dictive, feed-forward element into the control system can lead quite
easily to unstable behavior iii the form of "hunting"—cycles of in-
creasing amplitude—unless the response to the prediction is a highly
damped one.
This diagram is drawn from Herbert A, Simon, "On the Application of
Servomechanism Theory in the Study of Production Control," Econometrica,
Vol. 20 (April 1952), pp. 247-268.. The use of servomechanisms is suggested
in intra-flrm analysis by rather strong analogies with the types of aciministra-
tive control devices and decision rules that are found in many business firms.
But judging by Modigthtni and Sauerlender's success in applying the analogy to
industry analysis, the usefulness of this device is by no means restricted to
cases where strong formal administrative apparatuses are present.
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Servomechanism analogies, with the precautions noted above,
should thus provide a useful tool for the study of control systems.
Judging from Modigliani and Sauerlender's application to an im-
portant segment of the cement industry, such analogies can be suc-
cessfully applied even in areas where articulate control systems
(such as those commonly found on the intra-firm level) are not
present in any formal and developed sense.
Diagram2
Servomechanical analogies have an additional appeal in suggesting
a useful distinction between what might be called "rational" be-
havior and "adaptive" behavior. The traditional model of economic
man has been that of a being who continually strives to attain op-
timal positions. The behavior of such a creature might be termed
"rational." Servomechanism theory suggests, however, the model
of an organism that continually adjusts its behavior so that it gets
along "well enough"—.it adjusts to changes in external conditions
rapidly enough and successfully enough to avoid trouble, but it
does not in any precise sense maximize or optimize.
Now human behavior probably exhibits elements of both the
"rational" and the "adaptive." The notion of adapting to change may.
well suggest a more realistic model of human behavior in the face
of uncertainty than any such sophisticated concept as "maximization
of discounted expected gain." If any optimizing principle is involved
in the process of adaptation, it is more akin to a "minimax" principle
than to a maximum principle. The adaptive system seeks to assure
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Comparison
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adjustment to the future whatever it may be, rather than optimal
adjustment to a future that is predicted and described in terms of
probability distributions. Even the concept of minimax probably at-
tributes to the adjustive mechanism a more precise criterion of
optimality than is generally
In any actual organism or organization the effectiveness of ad-
justment is restricted by, among other factors, limits on the com-
plexity of the problems the system can handle and the cost of se-
curing information. Traditional approaches tend to ignore these
costs, or impossibilities, of behaving rationally rather than adap-
tively. The notion that behavior is necessarily a mixture of the ra-
tional and the adaptive suggests the possibility of rephrasing the
question of optimality—of asking what is the optimal combination
of rational and adaptive behavior rules that should be designed into
the system. The advantages to be gained from eliminating or re-
ducing errors can thus be matched against the cost of securing this
greater precision—in much the same spirit as this is done in modern
theories of sampling.
Even if a model like that employed by Modigliani and Sauer-
lender is judged to be satisfactory in its handling of uncertainty, it
is hard to see how the model deals with mistakes—bona fide mis-
takes having nothing to do with uncertainty. It would seem prefer-
able to rest models of business and individual behavior on the as-
sumption that mistakes will repeatedly be made and that they will
be followed by corrective action looking toward the reduction of
undesirable consequences. Again, the mechanism that is suggested is
a combination of "adaptive" and "rational" behavior.
One further assumption in this paper should be questioned. This
is the assumption, implicitly made, that the system whose behavior
is to be predicted is a "given." Now when adaptive behavior must
take place in the face of uncertainty, one direction in which opti-
mality can be sought is by reducing the uncertainty—not by gaining
Closely associated with these types of behavior is the distinction between
"smooth" and "sudden" adjustments. In complex organisms, including man,
mechanisms exist for rational and adaptive adjustment; but also means exist
for detecting when the usual adjustment mechanism is inappropriate and for
bringing about sudden jumps from one mechanism to another, more appropriate
one. A crude example is the behavior of a businessman when he suddenly
becomes aware that he is involved in a price war or when, his business having
increased rapidly, his working capital position suddenly becomes an acute prob-
lem. As Modigliani and Sauerlender note, the use of switching devices by means
of which the entire behavioral properties of the system may be changed offers
possibilities in this direction.
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additional information, but by simplifying and stabilizing the sys-
tem about which information needs to be obtained. An engineering
analogy will illustrate the point. Humidity is an important variable
in the spinning room of a textile mill.' It would be possible to intro-
duce instruments to measure the humidity and continually adjust
the machinery to allow for it; but this is not done in modern in-
stallations. Instead a relatively uniform humidity is maintained in
the room to avoid the necessity for such adjustment.
Many examples can be found in business behavior of adaptation
to uncertainty by removing or reducing its sources, The desire often
evidenced by oligopolistic firms to maintain a constant share of the
market fall under this head. The costs associated with ad-
justment to unpredicted or unpredictable variation in sales may be
so great that, even from a profit standpoint, it is preferable to seek
certainty in sales volume by tacit agreement as to market shares.
The drive toward product differentiation and the aversion to price
competition in oligopolistic situations may. be based, at least partly,
on the same motivations.
All of these complications emphasize, as was mentioned at the
outset of these comments, that the study of business forecasts, plans,
and expectations must take into account the purposes that the pre-
diction mechanisms serve, and the role that they play (in relation
to the other mechanisms) in the total process of adjustment to un-
certainty and change.
A. C. HART,ColumbiaUniversity
If you look at the literature of dynamics, you will find a
fairly clear-cut separation between expectational dynamics and me-
chanical dynamics. In mechanical models, which predominate, the
events of past periods enter the equations that determine the events
of future periods. In expectational models the corresponding rela-
tionships carry expectations of past periods.
The mechanical model may of course rest on an expectational
theory. Notably in Lawrence Klein's Economic Fluctuations do we
find preliminary operations with equations in which anticipations
figure. But these equations are of such a structure that presently we
carry out a substitution, and the result is a set of equations in which
only events appear explicitly, and which can be "fitted" to the record
of events without requiring any data on anticipations. But note the
implications about the formation of anticipations: they must be de-
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rived from events endogenous to the model, on a pattern that is
either invariant or at most very smoothly changing.
Many of our best mathematical economists are uninterested in
expectational dynamics because they object to any system that will
not "yield cyclical fluctuations." If we take initial anticipations (like
initial stocks of equipment) into our model as "data," we cannot
progress far. For stocks of equipment the course of events yields
a path of change, so that we can specify events of the first period
and set up this part of our data for the second period. But to set up
anticipations for the second period is another matter. The utopian
solution is to find a comprehensive anticipationforming equation
(which may involve widening the coverage of economists to take in,
say, the influence of events on economic journalism) and derive the
anticipations as well as the stock of equipment for each successive
period. But unless we are prepared to postulate economic determin-
ism for all the phenomena that may influence anticipations—in-
cluding wars, elections, rise of political leaders, and the like—we
may find our model does not work.
This is scarcely a reason for resting content with mechanical
models. If in fact expectations carry heavy weight, and if in fact
they are heavily influenced by events economists must treat as
exogenous, mechanical models will prove misleading as images of
prolonged economic sequences.
My impression is that for concrete forecasting we shall be best
with models that take initial expectations as data, and incorpo-
rate a rough theory of how expectations respond to surprises. The
maximum reach of these jforecasts will be hard to gauge until we
know more about anticipations and their revision, but presumably
it is of the order of one to two years—longer in some contexts than
in others.
We also need models of economic fluctuations to exhibit the mean-
ing of our theories of economic interdependence, to forecast the
differential effect on fluctuations of alternative policies, and (as a
means to the foregoing) to interpret the past in relation to our
theories. For this purpose recent developments suggest a hybrid
between mechanical and expectational dynamics.
More and more, we find ourselves setting up mechanical models
that contain "switching formulas." Some of the equations in our
system have substitutes; and we work with a rule that tells us in
some circumstances to suppress equation 11 and use instead the
alternative equation ha. The suggestion made earlier in the Con-
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ference for including a government-reaction equation is an example
of this logic. So long as economic events do not stir up the govern-
ment, equations that assume (for example) constant tax rates apply.
But if unemployment or inflation passes a certain threshold, these
equations will no longer apply, and we may be able to introduce
a substitute set. Another example of this logic is the substitution of
"exogenous" values for various durable goods in the transition models
of 1945-1946; still another, the Hicksian "ceiling."
For guidance in setting up both the alternative equations and the
switching rules, the study of business forecasting and decision-mak-
ing will probably prove crucial. This should mean gains for our
theories, our differential forecasts of policy results, and our concrete
forecasts for the near future.
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